

HISTORY PRIMERS


HISTORY OF GREECE

C. A. FYFFE





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PERSIAN EMPIRE AND GREECE.

History Primers.

Edited by J. R. GREEN.



HISTORY
OF
GREECE.

BY

C. A. FYFFE, M.A.,

FELLOW AND LATE TUTOR OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.

WITH MAPS.

NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
1, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET.
1890.

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HISTORY PRIMERS.

G R E E C E.

CHAPTER I.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE GREEKS.

1. Greeks and Italians.—Most of the history that we have of Europe before the birth of Christ is the history of the Greeks and Italians. They were not the only nations in ancient Europe ; there were other great races, such as the Gauls, and our own forefathers, the Germans. Why is it that ancient history tells us so much about the Greeks and the Italians, and so little about these ? Because, while the Greeks and Italians learnt to live in cities, and made reasonable laws and governments, and grew rich by trade, these other nations remained savage and ignorant. If we knew their history during those times, it would not interest us. We should hear of little but battles and wanderings ; and after hundreds of years we should find them living in much the same rough way as at the beginning. But while the northern races were still barbarous, the Greeks and Italians had begun to live more like modern nations, and had done great deeds, whose effects last to this day. The Greeks saved Europe from being conquered by Asiatic races, and spread a happier and more interesting life among the nations round them. Not that the Greeks were perfect, any more than other nations, ancient or modern. They had faults in abundance, and a great part of their history is the history of discord and violence. But in the midst of these evils we shall meet with instances of the most striking goodness ; and while the vices of the Greeks belonged to other ancient nations, their good points raised them in many

respects above all the rest of mankind. No race ever did so many different things well as the Greeks. They were the first people who thought of finding out the truth and the reason in everything. Busy men in our own day take pleasure in what remains of the Greek writers of poetry and history; and artists know that they can never make anything more beautiful than what is left of Greek sculpture. Men will always be interested in ancient Greece, not only because the Greeks were so bright and so clever themselves, but because so many things which we value most in our own life, such as the desire for knowledge, the power of speaking eloquently, and the arts of music and painting, have come down to us from the Greeks.

2. Connection of Greeks with other Races.

Yet the Greeks were not, like the Arabs or Chinese, of a quite different race from our forefathers, the northern nations who were then so barbarous. In very ancient times, long before the oldest books were written, there was a people living between the Caspian Sea and the mountains to the west of India, from whom not only the Greeks and Italians but most other European nations, as well as the Hindoos, are descended. The words used by all these nations for certain things are very like one another; and this shows that there was a time when they were a single race, using the same words. Thus the words for *father* in all these languages are merely the same word a little changed: German, *vater*; Greek, *πατήρ* (*patēr*); Latin, *pater*; Old Hindoo, *pita*. In the course of time, as this people grew larger, different parts of it went off in different directions, and became distinct nations. They grew more and more unlike one another, and made such changes in the old language which they had all spoken, that, instead of there being one language for all, each nation came to have one of its own. One part of the people went to India, another part to North Europe: other branches spread over Italy, Greece, and Asia

Minor. The Italians and Greeks were a single nation long after the Germans and Hindoos had separated from them ; and therefore their languages are much more like one another than either of them is to the language of the German or the Hindoo. Some of the races in the west of Asia Minor seem to have been originally much like the Greeks ; and in very early times it is probable that men crossed from the coast of Asia Minor to Greece, and founded kingdoms on the Greek coast. Afterwards bodies of Greeks settled on the Asiatic coast ; and therefore, though European Greece is called *Greece Proper*, the west coast of Asia Minor (First Map) was equally called Greece, for the people who lived there were Greeks, and were mixed up in all that happened in Greek history. The Greeks did not call themselves Greeks but *Heilēnes* (Ἕλληνες) : and any district in which Hellenes lived was called *Hellas* (Ἑλλάς), whether it was in Europe, Asia, or Africa. We shall see how adventurous a people the Greeks were, and how they founded colonies in distant parts of the Mediterranean, and on the shores of the Black Sea.

3. Greece not one but many States.—There is one great difference between ancient Greece and a modern country like England. All England is under one chief government, namely the Queen acting under the advice of her Parliament ; and the laws made in Parliament are obeyed by the whole nation. Each town is allowed to manage some of its own affairs, such as lighting and paving its streets, but no town is independent of the laws and government of the whole country. We have one army and one navy for the whole country, and no part of England would think of separating itself from the rest. But Greece was not a single country like this. It was broken up into little districts, each with its own government. Any little city might be a complete State in itself, and independent of its neighbours. It might possess only a few miles of land and a few hundred inhabitants,

and yet have its own laws, its own government, and its own army, though the army might not be so large as a single English regiment. In a space smaller than an English county there might be several independent cities, sometimes at war, sometimes at peace with one another. Therefore when we say that the west coast of Asia Minor was part of Greece, we do not mean that this coast-land and European Greece were under one law and one government, for both were broken up into a number of little independent States: but we mean that the people who lived on the west coast of Asia Minor were just as much Greeks as the people who lived in European Greece. They spoke the same language, and had much the same customs, and they called one another *Hellenes*, in contrast to all other nations of the world, whom they called *barbarians* (βάρβαροι), that is, “the unintelligible folk,” because they could not understand their tongue.

4. **Greece cut up by Mountains.**—Greece, from the first, was not a single State like England, but divided into many little ones. Homer gives a long list of kings who brought their forces to the siege of Troy (p. 11); and all through Greek history we shall be reading about a number of very small States. Why was this? Because Greece was naturally cut up into little pieces by mountains. In the south of England we can get easily from any one place to any other; and, where there are hills, they are not high or rugged enough to prevent our having roads over them. But in Greece there are so many mountains really difficult to cross, that the fertile spots among them, where people settled, are quite cut off from one another; and in early times, before men made much use of ships, they would hardly ever see any one outside their own valleys. We shall see what a difference this made to Greece if we compare it with Egypt or Babylon. Egypt is the rich flat land on both sides of the Nile. You can sail up the Nile with the wind, and

drop down it with the current, so that it was always easy to go from one part of Egypt to another. Hence from the earliest times Egypt has been a single country, under one great king, like the Pharaohs in the Bible. It is the same with the rich flat lands about Babylon on the river Euphrates. There was nothing to separate one part of that country from another; a single king ruled over a large district, and could raise a great army. The power and magnificence of the kings overawed the people, who had no thought of resisting the royal power. Hence the kings of Babylon became absolute masters over their subjects, like Nebuchadnezzar (Daniel iii.), and the people were little more than slaves. In Greece the case was the reverse of this. There is no one large flat tract in the whole of Greece. The mountains divide it into a number of very small districts, and in each of these districts the king was only like the chief among the heads of the families. He had not wealth enough to live in a splendid palace like eastern kings, and make the people think he was a kind of god; nor could he raise a great army, and overrun neighbouring countries, and make the people his slaves.

5. Greeks and Phœnicians.—In the beginning then we find the Greeks, broken up into little groups, covering European Greece and the islands near it (Map, p. 10), and races very like them upon the west coast of Asia Minor. The rich men owned flocks and herds, corn-lands and vineyards; the poor had little farms of their own, or worked as labourers for the rich. But upon the coast a new and busier life was beginning. There the Greek first met the Phœnician (Canaanite) merchant from Tyre or Sidon (First Map) (see 1 Kings ix. 27; x. 22), who had begun to trade with distant lands, while the Greeks were still simple farmers. The Phœnicians had an alphabet, and a scale of weights and measures, long before the Greeks. They had made many discoveries, or learnt them from other Eastern nations. They had learnt how to make a

purple dye for hangings and for great men's robes from the shell of a little sea-creature, and how to dig mines and to work metals (2 Chronicles iii. 3, 7 ; Esther viii. 15). When the best trees in the forests of Mount Lebanon were cut down, and the Phœnicians had to go in search of wood for their ships, they found abundance of oak, pine, and beech on the shores of the Ægæan Sea. They discovered that the root of the Greek evergreen oak could be used for tanning,



GREECE AND THE ÆGÆAN COASTS.

and its berries for a dye ; and often in these same forest districts they found copper, iron, and silver. Hence the Phœnicians came more and more to the Greek coasts, freighting their ships with goods made at Tyre or Sidon, and exchanging them with the Greeks for timber or wool, or even for men and women, whom they sold as slaves. In time the Greeks on the coast came to know all that the Phœnicians knew : they took their alphabet, their weights, and

their measures ; and they made ships like those which the Phœnicians used, and began to sail along the shores. At first when they took to the sea it was not so much for trade as for piracy. Piracy was not thought wrong. A band of bold men would launch their vessel and sail along the coast to attack the first merchant-ship they might meet, or would land and plunder the villages on the shore. In terror of the pirates the inhabitants of these villages often left their old homes, and established themselves at some distance from the shore.

6. **Homeric Poems.**—Two long poems have come down to us from the very early times of Greece, which the Greeks believed to have been written by a single poet named Homer. One of these, called the *Iliad*, tells us of the deeds of the heroes at the siege of *Troy*, or *Ilion*. Paris, son of Priam, king of Ilion, according to the stories, carried off Helen, the wife of Menelæus, king of Sparta ; and in order to recover her the Greeks united to besiege Troy, and took it after ten years' siege. The greatest hero among the Greeks in the *Iliad* is Achilles ; among the Trojans, Hector. The other poem, called the *Odyssey*, is about the wanderings and adventures of Odysseus (Ulysses), king of Ithäca, the wisest of all the Greeks, on his return home after Troy was taken. The *Iliad* gives us a picture of warfare ; the *Odyssey* shows us the quiet life of the family of Odysseus at home, and also tells about wonderful places and people, such as the early Greek sailors may have brought home stories about, and such as we now read of in fairy tales. Though the Homeric poems do not relate things that really happened, they give us some idea of the way in which the Greeks must have been living when these poems were composed. Each district was governed by a king (*βασιλεὺς*), who was also priest and offered up the public prayers and sacrifices. By the side of the king there were a number of chiefs, also called *βασιλεῖς*, whom the king assembled in

council (*βουλή*), to ask their advice upon anything that he intended to do. Each chief had the right to say what he thought; and though the king was not bound to go by their advice, we can see how the council of the chiefs would in fact diminish the king's power. When the king had made up his mind, he assembled the common people in the market-place (*ἀγορά*), and made known to them what he was going to do. The chiefs might speak to the people when they were thus assembled, but no one among the common people was allowed to speak, nor did it signify what the people thought. In the Homeric poems we hear very little about the common people: it was the chiefs, and not the people, who kept the king from being an absolute ruler. When one of the common people, Thersites, says what he thinks, Odysseus beats him severely, and the people side with Odysseus. Like the early ages of all countries, the Homeric age was a time of war and violence. Plundering expeditions both by land and by sea were common: if people could not protect themselves they were liable to have their property carried off, and to be made into slaves themselves. War was carried on very cruelly, and some of the actions of Achilles described in the *Iliad* are what we should consider very savage. Deceit was not thought wrong, but was rather admired if cleverly carried out. On the other hand there are many fine and beautiful qualities in the Homeric age. The members of a family love and respect one another. Great reverence is shown to parents. The wife is treated with more honour by her husband than she was in most other countries, or than she was in Greece itself in later times. There are deep and faithful friendships, and sometimes there is true affection even between the master and his slave.

7. Early Kingdoms—Crete, Troy.—We know very little about the events of these early times. Real history does not go so far back; and we have only

stories about them which tell us very little truth. One of the great kings in the stories is Minos, king of Crete (map, p. 10). Minos, the Greeks believed, was a just and powerful king, who ruled over all the Greek seas and islands, and put an end to the pirates, establishing peace and safety. They believed that after his death he was made a judge over the souls of the dead, because he had ruled so strongly and so justly. Now it is certain that no king in those early times really had such wide power as Minos is said to have had : but it is perhaps true that in Crete a seafaring life began earlier than elsewhere in Greece, and that the Cretan kings did something towards checking piracy.

On the coast of Asia Minor one of the earliest kingdoms was the Troas, or land of Troy, at the south end of the Hellespont, the southernmost of the two straits that lead from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Its castle and town stood a few miles inland at the point where the hills begin to rise. The tales about the siege of Troy are perhaps only beautiful stories ; but there is no doubt that in the earliest times there was a town there. We must not think of these early towns as large places like our modern towns. They were little more than villages with walls round them.

8. Kings in Peloponnēsus.—Many stories are told about the great families who reigned in Thebes and in Peloponnēsus (map, p. 19), and of their wars and misfortunes. The greatest of all the kings in these stories is Agamemnon, king of Mykēnæ, whom Homer describes as commanding all the Greeks at the siege of Troy. Now we may be quite sure that in those early times the Greeks never acted all together in the way that Homer describes : still, whatever may be the truth about Agamemnon, there certainly were powerful kings at Mykenæ and other places in the district of Argōlis, for the walls of their castles remain to this day. These walls are not built in the way in which the later Greeks built their walls, but are made of enormous blocks of stone, so huge that the Greeks

thought that the builders must have been giants, and called such buildings *Cyclopean*, that is, the work of a *Cyclops*, or giant. At Tiryns in Argolis there are Cyclopean walls twenty-five feet thick, with a passage inside them: and at Mykenæ there are walls more carefully built, with two great lions carved in stone over the gateway. Not far from these there is a large underground building, the inside of which was once covered with plates of bronze. This was the treasure-house and sepulchre of the kings.

9. Dorians enter Peloponnesus. Colonies in Asia.—Though the kings in Argolis built such strong castles, their kingdoms were overthrown. A hardy warlike tribe called Dorians left their homes in North Greece, and moved southward, in search of a fertile country. They came into Peloponnesus, and proved themselves stronger than the tribes who were then living there, who were called *Achæans* and *Ionians*. Many of the Ionians would not submit to be ruled by Dorians: they joined with other Ionians who were living in Attica, the country about Athens (map, p. 19), and sailed away to Asia Minor, where they settled on the central part of the coast, and on the islands opposite to it, and founded Milêtus and Ephësus (Acts xix. 1; xx. 15), and other cities called the *Ionic Colonies*. Athens claimed to be the mother-city of the Ionic colonies, though many of them did not start from Attica. Many Achæans also sailed away from Peloponnesus, and made themselves homes in the island of Lesbos, and on the north part of the western coast of Asia Minor. The cities in this district were however not called the *Achæan* but the *Æolic Colonies*. Many of the Dorians too, when they heard of the fine climate and fertile lands across the sea, took ship themselves, and settled in Crete, and on the south part of the west coast of Asia Minor. The cities they founded were called the *Dorian Colonies*, and the most famous of them was Rhodes. Thus the coming of the Dorians into Peloponnesus put an

end to the power of the Achæan kings whom Homer describes, and led to the foundation of a number of great cities in Asia Minor. But we must not suppose that either the conquest or the emigration took place all at once: perhaps both were going on for hundreds of years.

10. **Dorians in Peloponnesus.**—The Dorians were not numerous enough to scatter themselves over the whole of Peloponnesus. On the north coast, on the shore of the Gulf of Corinth, they allowed the Achæans to remain in peace. This district was therefore called Achæa, and it contained twelve cities. Nor did the Dorians conquer the mountainous country of Arkadia in the middle of Peloponnesus. Arkadia remained as it was, and went through fewer changes than any other district in Greece, so that *Arcadian* came to mean *rustic* or *old-fashioned*. On the west coast, the land of Elis was taken by the Ætolians, another tribe from the north of Greece. In the rest of Peloponnesus the Dorians made themselves masters: and it is after their invasion that the old poetic stories end and real history begins.

11. **Armies and Assemblies.**—The Greek States being very small, the citizens in each did not keep a distinct class of men for fighting, like our army; but every citizen of a certain age had to serve as a soldier when there was war. Another consequence of the smallness of the Greek States was, that in each of them the whole body of citizens who were allowed to have any share in the government was able to assemble in one place. In a large modern State like England, it is impossible for all the citizens to meet at a single spot; and therefore the towns and counties choose men to represent them in Parliament. This is called Representative Government, and it makes it possible for a large country to be free and well governed. The opposite of Representative Government is where the citizens all actually meet together, as in the Greek States; but this is only possible where the State is very small.

12. **Greek Gods and Heroes.**—The Greeks believed in a number of gods, and in each place certain gods were worshipped more than the rest. They thought that each god cared for some particular places or matters, and did not trouble himself about others. Thus the goddess Athēnē was believed to protect Athens, and greater honours were paid to her there than to any other deity. Some of the gods were originally things in nature : for instance, Apollo was originally the sun ; but the Greeks made divine persons out of them, and stories were told of the deeds they had done. Except that they lived for ever, and had great power, the Greek gods were very like human beings ; and they were represented by statues in the form of men and women, but more grand and beautiful. The Greeks never worshipped animals, like the Egyptians, nor made their gods in frightful shapes, like the Hindoos. The king of the gods was Zeus. The *Heroes* were not gods, but a race stronger than men, who lived long ago, and did wonderful things that men cannot do now. The tales told about the gods and heroes are called *myths* (μῦθοι). Every village had some myths of its own, and when men tried to put them all together they made long books, and the whole collection of myths is called *Mythology*. The Greeks not only believed the myths to be real facts, but there was hardly anything they would not account for by some story about the gods or heroes. Each city had myths which explained how its customs had begun. For instance, if a Spartan were asked why there were always two kings at Sparta (p. 22) he would say, "Because Aristodēmus, the hero who first led the Spartans into the country, had twin sons."

The gods were worshipped by prayer and sacrifices, but worship was not then, as it is now, something in which everybody could join. In each place there were originally groups of families which had certain worships of their own, and whoever did not

belong to these families had not a share in the same worship.

13. **The Earliest Unions religious.**—We come now to the first kind of union that existed between Greek States. Long before there were any alliances or treaties of peace, tribes that lived near one another would unite to worship a certain god at a particular spot, and would agree to treat his sanctuary, or the ground set apart for his worship, as holy ground, even when at war with one another, and to join in defending it from all harm. Solemn festivals would be held at regular times, in which all the tribes concerned might take part; and deputies from these tribes would meet to see that the temple and its lands were properly looked after, and suffering no harm. Gradually, from acting in agreement in what concerned the temple, a set of tribes would make agreements about other matters, for instance not to do certain cruel things when at war with one another: and at last they might make a treaty of perpetual peace, and undertake to defend one another against all enemies. They would bind themselves to this treaty by taking an oath before the god whom they all worshipped. This is how the earliest unions of States arose. In such a union there was generally one State stronger than the rest; this State was said to have the *hegemony*, that is, the *leadership* (*ἡγεμονία*) of the league. Therefore as the earliest leagues had arisen out of religious unions, and were founded upon the oath taken before the god, the later Greeks, whenever they made a league, established a common worship or festival, in which all the members of the league joined (p. 75).

14. **Delphic Amphictyony.**—One great religious union existed in the north of Greece in early times. Twelve tribes united to worship Apollo at Delphi (map, p. 19), and to protect his temple there; and deputies from all of them met twice a year to settle matters that had to do with the temple. This union, which was called the Delphic

Amphictyony, did not grow into an actual league, and the tribes continued to make war on one another; but they took an oath not to do two things when at war, namely, not to destroy one another's towns, and not to cut off running water from a town when besieged. The meeting of the deputies was called the Amphictyonic Council, that is, the Council of the neighbours (*ἀμφικτιόνες*).

15. **Delphic Oracle.**—The temple at Delphi, from being the common sanctuary of these twelve tribes, and one of the meeting-places of the Amphictyonic Council, became the most important temple in Greece. *Oracles* were given there, that is, pretended answers of the god Apollo to those who came to consult him. The managers of the temple were very skilful men; they found out what was going on in distant places, and often gave very good advice in the oracles. The fame of the temple was carried over all Greece, and into foreign lands. In early times the priests seem to have done good to Greece by spreading ideas of justice and goodness in the name of the god, and by making the scattered Greek States feel that they were one nation, and that there was one divine law which they must all obey. As, however, the priests gave oracles upon the struggles between States, and on questions of war and government, powerful men who wished for the support of the oracle began to bribe the priests to take their side. Thus the oracle lost credit: and in the Persian wars, of which we shall presently read, it damaged itself still more by disheartening the Greeks instead of encouraging them to make a bold resistance.

CHAPTER II.

PELOPONNESUS DOWN TO B.C. 500.—COLONIES.

1. **Dorians and old Population.**—The conquest of Peloponnesus must have been made little by little, for there were many strong places, and the Dorians were very few in number compared with the

people in the land. The Dorians divided themselves into bands; and each band became a little independent State. They did not destroy the inhabitants of the districts where they settled, but treated them as an inferior people, and allowed them no share in the



SOUTHERN GREECE.

government. In Sparta the ancient inhabitants never gained power again, but in most of their settlements the Dorians were not able to keep everything in their own hands for very long. We shall see in this chapter how the Dorians and the conquered people dealt with one another in the different States.

2. Sparta.—One Dorian band took possession of the town of Lacedæmon, or Sparta, with its corn fields (*σπαρτή*, *sparte*, *sown land*, from *σπείρω*), at the foot of Mount Tāyġētus, on the banks of the river Eurōtas, twenty miles from its mouth. They were like a little army in an enemy's country. All around them was the old Achæan population. If they wanted more land, they could only gain it by fighting. Little by little they pushed their border forward. They attacked and conquered their neighbours, both Dorian and Achæan, one after another, until they had won the country on both sides of the Eurotas as far as the sea. The best of the land they took to themselves; the rest they left to its old owners.

3. Periæki and Helots.—The conquered population was divided into two classes—*Periæki* (*περίοικοι*, *dwellers-around*), the old inhabitants, who were allowed to keep their farms, and *Helots* (*ἐῖλωτες*, perhaps from *ἔλω*, *take prisoner*), serfs employed to till the lands of the Spartans. The Periæki had to serve as soldiers with the Spartans, without being allowed any voice in the government; they were dealt with as inferiors, so that marriage was forbidden between Spartans and Periæki; but they kept their property and were not ill treated. The lot of the Helots was far worse. A certain number of Helot families had to live on each of the farms which the Spartans had seized; they were not allowed to go away, or to choose their own occupations, but had to cultivate the land and to take a fixed quantity of corn and wine and oil every year to Sparta to the owner of the farm. What the farm produced above this they were allowed to keep. They were not, however, quite like ordinary slaves, for they might not be sold or removed from the land. Now this was the condition of a great part of the English nation in early times, and of a great part of the Russians till very lately; but the Helots were not content in their oppression, like a people who had never been

anything but serfs ; they knew that they had been a free people until the coming of the Spartans, and that they were as good Greeks as their masters. They bore such hatred to the Spartans that it was said a Helot would gladly eat a Spartan raw. The Spartans were in constant fear of a revolt of the Helots ; and a band of young Spartans was employed to keep a watch upon them, and secretly murder those who seemed bravest and most dangerous.

4. **Spartans a body of Soldiers.** — The Dorians, when they conquered Peloponnesus, lived like a band of soldiers ; and though in most of their settlements they took to more peaceable ways and to city life, in Sparta they were so placed that they had to keep to their soldierly habits, and make them even more severe. While in other parts of Peloponnesus men took to peaceful occupations, the Spartans were in constant warfare. They lived like an army on duty. They could only conquer their neighbours, and be safe against the Helots, by being always ready to fight. In the States upon the coast the old inhabitants gained riches by trading, and after a time the rule of the Dorians was broken down : but at Sparta, far inland, there was no commerce, and the Spartans were resolved to remain absolute masters of the other inhabitants of the country, though they were not a tenth part of their number. Therefore they thought only of making themselves as strong a body of soldiers as possible. Their town was not a place of business like other Greek towns : to the last it remained like a large village, without fine buildings ; and it was too securely placed to need a wall. The laws and customs of Sparta, which were said to have been made by Lykurgus, turned the whole life of the Spartans into a preparation for war. No child was allowed to be reared who was not strong and healthy in body. At the age of seven, boys were taken from their families and trained by state officers. They had to practice gymnastics and the use of arms, and to go

through every exercise that a soldier would go through in actual warfare. They learnt to bear all sorts of hardships without complaining; they were kept short of food in order to encourage them to hunt on the mountains; and sometimes they were flogged almost to death before the altars of the gods. Learning and knowledge did not exist in those days; and when they began the Spartans did not care for them. But the boys were not brought up as mere savages; they were taught a simple warlike kind of music and poetry. Thus during their boyhood the Spartans were trained like soldiers; and when they grew up to be men their life was just as hard. Instead of living at home with their wives, they had to drill every day, and to dine together at the public mess, and to sleep in barracks. Fifteen men dined at each table; the dinner was very coarse and poor, the chief dish being black barley-broth. Even the women were made to practise gymnastics. The women had much of the high spirit of the men, and were treated with more respect than in any other Greek State. They loved brave men and hated cowards; and a Spartan mother would rather hear that her son was dead than that he had run away from battle. No Spartan was allowed to trade; and, as their farms were cultivated by Helots, they had nothing to do with agriculture, and could give their whole lives up to military exercises. In order to prevent trade with foreigners, the Spartans had iron money, which was of no use in other States.

5. Government—Kings, Senate, Ephors.—Almost everywhere else in Greece government by kings came to an end, and the nobles ruled; but at Sparta, which disliked all change, kings continued. There were always two Spartan kings together, and this prevented their being too powerful. The council of chiefs which we read of in Homer was preserved in Sparta as a Senate of twenty-eight old men, all past sixty, called *Gerusia* (from γέρων, *old man*): and, just as in Homer the common people meet in the market-

place to hear what the king will say, so at Sparta the whole assembly of citizens had to meet in order to pass a law. But the magistrates alone might speak; the citizens had only to vote *yes* or *no*, and had really very little to do with the management of the State. So far the forms of government at Sparta were like what we see in Homer, except that there were two kings. But in the course of time new magistrates arose, called *Ephors* (ἐφόροι, *overseers*), who soon made themselves the real governors of the State. The Ephors were elected by the assembly, and controlled all Spartans, and even the kings. They transacted business with other States, and proposed all laws. They had not to account to anyone for what they had done, and therefore there was a greater secrecy in the government of Sparta than anywhere else in Greece.

6. **Argos.**—Sparta was not at first the strongest of the Dorian States. In the old Achæan times the greatest king had been the king of Mykenæ in the north-east of Peloponnesus; and now, though Mykenæ declined, the neighbouring town of Argos was at first the strongest Dorian state in Peloponnesus. There were many other Dorian settlements in the north-east, such as Corinth and Sikyon; these were all in alliance with Argos, and united in worshipping Apollo, as the god of the league. They sent offerings every year to a temple of Apollo, which stood at Argos; and acknowledged Argos to be the head of the league (p. 17). Argos had also a large territory of its own, extending far southwards along the east coast. When, therefore, the Spartans went on conquering eastwards, they came into conflict with the Argives, and from that time Sparta and Argos were rivals and enemies. The Argives were driven out of their southern territory, and then out of the border district called Kynuria, so that Sparta had now all the country between Mount Taygetus and the eastern sea. This is the country called *Laconia* (Λακωνική). At the same time the authority of Argos over its allies declined, and Sparta

began to rank instead of Argos as the first State in the Peloponnesus.

7. **Olympian Festival.**—In the west of Peloponnesus there was an ancient sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia, on the river Alphēus. Eighteen towns united to offer sacrifice there, and a great festival was held once in four years. The towns of Elis and Pisa disputed for the management of the festival: Sparta took the part of Elis, and gave Elis the management. Now this was something more than a common alliance between two States; for the Spartans wished to make the Olympian festival a great religious gathering for the whole of Greece, in order that Sparta, as the protector of the festival, might be acknowledged the leading State in Greece. Everything was done to make the festival as attractive as possible. Races and athletic sports were established, at which all Greeks might compete; and heralds were sent all over Greece announcing when the festival was to be held, and inviting all Greeks to contend in the games (*ἀγῶνες*). At first there was only a foot-race: boxing and wrestling matches and other trials of strength were afterwards added, as well as horse-races and chariot-races. After a time the roads through other States that led towards Olympia were protected for some days before and after the festival, in order that people might go and return in safety; and at last the whole month of the festival was observed as a time of peace all over Greece. Thus the Olympian games, and the rules connected with them, helped to make the Greeks feel that they were a single nation, although they were so many independent States. It became the custom for every State to send deputies to represent it at the games, and to present its offering to the god; and each State was anxious that its deputies should make a more magnificent show than those of the others. Thousands of Greeks came as spectators; the plain of Olympia during the games was like a great camp. The winners were the happiest men in

Greece. Though their only prize was a crown of wild olive, it was the greatest distinction that a Greek could gain. The most powerful princes sought to make a figure at the games, and every State took pride in the victory of one of its citizens. There were three other festivals in Greece of the same kind, but the Olympian was the greatest.

8. **Sparta conquers Messenia.**—Immediately west of the Spartans were the Messenians, a hardy Doric race like themselves. Two long and desperate wars were waged before Messenia was subdued (B.C. 750—650). Argos, Arkadia and Sikyon, fearing that Sparta meant to conquer them all in turn, sent help to Messenia; Corinth and Elis assisted Sparta. Thus nearly the whole of Peloponnesus fought on one side or the other. The spirit of the Spartans was failing, when an Athenian poet named Tyrtaeus came among them and stirred their hearts with his songs. War-like songs and dances were part of the training of the Spartans; they did not read their new poems quietly in a book, as we do, but sang them in troops before the tent of the king, and on the march to battle. The Spartans persevered; the brave resistance of the Messenians was of no avail, and they became a conquered people. The best of their land was taken by the Spartans; on the rest they had to live not as Perioeki but as Helots. Yet in their oppression the Messenians never ceased to feel that they were a distinct nation. Three hundred years later a Theban general, Epaminondas, who had overthrown the power of Sparta, proclaimed to the Messenians that they were again a free people. A city was built, and Messenia again ranked among the Grecian States (B.C. 369). But for these three hundred years Messenia had no share in all that was done by Greece.

9. **Tegæa.**—Having conquered Messenia, Sparta now possessed the southern part of Peloponnesus from sea to sea. It next attacked the States on the southern border of Arkadia. But here the Spartans

found a country and a race that they could not subdue. The citizens of Tegēa destroyed and captured their armies, and made the Spartan prisoners labour as slaves in the fields in the chains which they had brought for the Tegeans. All hope of conquering Arkadia was given up: Sparta gladly accepted the Tegeans as her allies (about B.C. 560), and the Tegeans were willing to acknowledge Sparta as the head of Peloponnesus, and to follow her as their leader. At the sources of the river Alpheus a pillar was set up with the words of the treaty cut upon it. Tegea remained true to Sparta; and its soldiers, who had made the Spartans feel their courage, were allowed to serve on the left wing, a place of honour, in the army of Sparta and her allies.

10. North-east Peloponnesus. Oligarchies.

—Let us now turn to the States in the north-east corner of Peloponnesus, namely Sikyon, Corinth, and Mēgāra. In all of these, as at Sparta, there was a body of Dorians living in the midst of the old population; but they had abolished kingly rule, and the government belonged to the noble families. The name the Greeks gave to this kind of government was *Oligarchy* or *Government by the Few* (ὀλίγοι, ἀρχή). In almost every State of Greece except Sparta the power of the kings grew less and less, and the noble families took more of the management of affairs into their own hands, till at last they put an end to kingly government altogether. These families, or *clans*, were supposed to be the descendants of the heroes: they were separated, like a sacred race, from the mass of the people; they had worships of their own in which the commons had no share (p. 16); and they alone knew the laws, which were not written, but handed down, as a kind of sacred knowledge, by word of mouth. They did not feel themselves fellow-citizens of one State with the common people, but considered that they made up the State by themselves, and did not acknowledge that any

one outside their body had any rights at all. As a rule they owned good estates, while the common people either worked upon little farms of their own, or made their living as labourers, or by trade. Sometimes the nobles lived in a distinct district by themselves.

11. *Sikyōn*.—This was the case at Sikyōn; the Dorian nobles lived on the slope of the hills, while the common people lived in the plain, along the banks of the river Asōpus, and on the sea-shore at its mouth. The nobles called them *Ægialeans*, or *men of the shore*, and did not at first allow them to serve as soldiers or to act as citizens in any way. But after a time, being in great need of soldiers, they made the *Ægialeans* serve, arming them with clubs, while they themselves had swords and lances. But while the Dorian nobles were living on the produce of their lands, the *Ægialeans* were growing rich by trade and industry; and about the year B.C. 676, a rich *Ægialean*, named Orthagōras, put himself at the head of the common people, and overthrew the government of the nobles. Orthagoras made himself master of the whole State, and governed it like a king, handing over his power to his son after him. The descendants of Orthagoras, called the Orthagoridæ, were rulers of Sikyon for a hundred years. They took the part of the common people, and abolished all the privileges of the Dorians. Thus the power of the Dorian nobles in Sikyon came to an end, and Sikyon was no longer an Oligarchy, but governed by a single man.

12. *Meaning of Tyrannus*.—Sovereigns like Orthagoras and his descendants were not, however, called *kings* (βασιλεῖς), but *tyrants* (τύραννοι). The Greek word *τύραννος* does not mean a ruler who governs *tyrannically* in our sense, but *a ruler whose power is above the laws and contrary to the laws*. Thus Pheidon, a king of Argos, is said to have made himself *τύραννος*—that is, he made himself an absolute king, when by the law and custom of Argos the king's power was limited. A king of Persia.

however tyrannically he might govern, would not be called *τύραννος*—for the law and custom of Persia was that the king's power should be almost absolute, that is, that he might do almost anything he chose. On the other hand the Orthagoridæ were all *τύραννοι*, however wisely and mildly they might govern, because their power was not in accordance with the law of Sikyon. Therefore, when we use the word *tyrant* for *τύραννος*, we must remember that we are not using it in the ordinary English sense.

13. First Sacred War.—One of the *Tyrants* of Sikyon, named Kleisthēnēs, was anxious to gain the favour of the Oracle of Delphi, and joined with Athens and some other States in a war on its behalf. The men of Krisa, which lies between Delphi and the sea, tried to make everyone pay a tax who passed through their town on his way to Delphi. Kleisthenes and the allies therefore made war on Krisa and destroyed it, and declared the land of the Krisæans sacred to the god, so that no one might ever again build upon it. This war is called the *First Sacred War*, and it lasted ten years, from B.C. 595 to B.C. 585.

14. Corinth.—At Corinth governments followed in the same order as at Sikyon,—Kings, Oligarchy, *Tyrants*. When the kings ended, the State was governed by two hundred noble families called the Bacchiādæ. Corinth from its position on the isthmus was the greatest trading-town in Greece. The roads from all parts of Greece met there, and the Corinthians made a tramway across the isthmus, over which ships, which were little more than boats in those days, were carried from one sea to the other, in order to save the dangerous voyage round Cape Malæa. Thus trade of all kinds came to Corinth. Ships were built there to suit the tramway, and sold to strangers, so that Corinth became the great ship-building town of Greece. The first artificial harbour of Greece was formed at Lechæum, the north port of Corinth; docks were made round it, and the

Corinthians made one improvement after another in their ships, till at last they invented the *Trireme* (τρεῖς, ἑρετρων), a vessel with three sets of oars one above the other, which became the regular Greek ship of war. Everything tended to make the Corinthians a seafaring people; and when troubles arose under the government of the Bacchiadæ, young nobles who were dangerous and discontented at home were encouraged to lead out colonies beyond the sea, where they would be able to take the lead. The greatest of these colonies were Kerkȳra, now Corfu, off the coast of Epīrus, and Syracuse in Sicily. (Map, p. 34.)

15. Kypsēlus overthrows the Bacchiadæ.—

But though the Bacchiadæ wisely encouraged the trade of Corinth, and got rid of dangerous men by means of colonies, they could not preserve their power. They had become few in number; they were hated by the people; and there were other Dorian families as noble as the Bacchiadæ, whom they kept out from any share in the government. One of these nobles married a daughter of a Bacchiad, whom no Bacchiad would marry because she was lame. Their son, Kypsēlus, had to take the rank not of his mother but of his father. Despised by the Bacchiadæ, Kypselus gained the favour of the people, and made himself master of the city. The oligarchy was destroyed; Kypselus reigned as *Tyrant* for thirty years (B.C. 655—625) and left the government to his son Periander.

16. Periander.—Periander, now forty years old, had studied the ways of the despotic kings of Asia, and was thought to have gained such skill and craft in ruling as no Greek had ever yet possessed. He was one of the "*Seven Wise Men*," and many clever Greek sayings about rulers and their subjects were quoted as his. Periander intended to be a king in appearance as well as in reality. His father Kypselus had lived like one of the citizens among the people: Periander on the contrary built a palace on the top of the great citadel of Corinth, and surrounded himself

with soldiers and with a court like an eastern monarch. He would allow no one to be powerful in the State but himself. If any Corinthian had great wealth, Periander made him give up a part of it; and out of the money he thus took he made splendid gifts to the gods. Periander loved poets and artists; poets lived at his court, and his offerings to the gods were noble works of art. He founded Colonies, and extended the power of Corinth far along the coast between Kerkyra and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. The trade of Corinth was so great that no taxes were needed beyond the harbour-dues. But in all his splendour Periander lived in dread of the spirit of liberty. The common people and traders, who had always been in subjection to kings or oligarchies, had no dislike to a despot: it was in the families which had hitherto ruled that the spirit of liberty was strong. Therefore Periander forbade all meetings in which men of high birth might stir up one another with the thought of freedom. He abolished the public dinners which had come down from old Dorian times, and the meeting of youths in the gymnasia; and he tried to make the citizens distrust one another, and live wholly with their wives and children. He wished that the people over whom he ruled should be his submissive servants, like the nations of the east (p. 9), not knowing that uncontrolled power turns a man into a savage, and that the despot becomes the most passionate and miserable of mankind. He grew cruel and suspicious. In a fit of anger he killed his wife, Melissa, whom he loved; then, seized with remorse, he made all the women in Corinth burn their robes in one great pile, as an offering to the dead. His two sons, who did not know how their mother had died, were staying with their grandfather, the father of Melissa. When the time came to depart, the old man took them aside and asked them if they knew the murderer of their mother. The elder was dull, and thought no more of it;

but the younger, Lykōphron, sought what it meant, and found that it was his father. When they returned to Corinth, Lykophron would not speak to his father, nor salute him. Periander drove him angrily from the palace; and when he found out what was in Lykophron's mind, he forbade the citizens to take him into their houses, or to speak to him, or give him food. For days Lykophron wandered silent and starving through the public places: then, when Periander thought his spirit must be broken, he approached him, and bade him come back to the palace. But Lykophron only answered scornfully that Periander had broken his own law by speaking to him. His father now sent him away to Kerkyra, and there he remained, as if forgotten, for many years. But when old age came upon Periander, and he knew that his eldest son was not fit to succeed him, he sent his daughter to Kerkyra, to persuade Lykophron to come home as his heir. Lykōphron told his sister that he would never come to Corinth as long as his father lived. Then Periander, in despair, offered to retire to Kerkyra if Lykophron would reign at Corinth. But when the Kerkyræans heard of this, they feared the coming of the old tyrant, and seized and killed Lykophron. Thus Periander's last hopes were destroyed. He took fierce vengeance on the Kerkyræans, and then died himself, having reigned forty years (B.C. 625—585).

17. *Mēgāra*.—In Mēgāra, about B.C. 620, Theagenēs made himself tyrant, and abolished the distinction between the Dorians and the rest of the population. He was, however, driven out, and violent conflicts followed between the nobles and the commons.


18. *The good and evil of the Tyrants*.—In a great number of other States tyrants arose about the same time. They began in the Ionic cities in Asia Minor, where men were acquainted with the absolute governments of eastern countries; and the reason why tyrants arose in so many different places, was,

that in all these places alike the noble families possessed all the rights in the State, and the common people possessed none. The tyrants gained their power by taking up the cause of the commons; and they did good in so far as they broke down that narrow system under which the few noble families made up the whole State by themselves, and the common people were treated as something outside the State. Till now the great religious ceremonies had belonged only to the noble families; the commons could take no share in them, and felt that they were not like a part of the State. The tyrants, on the other hand, made new and splendid festivals for the whole people; and, though the old families preserved and took great pride in their own special rites, the new worships helped to make the nobles and the commons feel that they were fellow-citizens of the same State. Thus when the tyrants came to an end, and the citizens took things into their own hands, the distinction between the noble families and the commons had become somewhat less, and they had a better idea of the State as something that included them all. The tyrants also did good to Greece by their encouragement of poetry and art. At their festivals a multitude of men heard new kinds of poetry and music, which could not spread themselves as poetry and music do now by means of printing. At the court of a great prince like Periander the cleverest men of all kinds were collected from all parts of Greece, so that whatever was best and newest everywhere became known to all, and all could profit by it. In general the first of each line of tyrants was a good ruler, and his successors far inferior to him. The man who raised himself to power, like Kypselus or Orthagoras, was able to do so because some one was needed to stand up for the people and break down the privileges of the nobles. He gained his power by doing a great work in the State, and the people put confidence in him. But his successors did

not come to the throne by anything they had done themselves. They were born princes, and often their only desire was to increase their own power. The nobles hated and plotted against them. Then, feeling their danger, and corrupted by power, the tyrants often became mere cruel oppressors, and tried to crush out all spirit and manliness. The common people did not as yet mind being ruled by a despot, for they had never had any share of the government under the oligarchies, and therefore had not yet come, as they afterwards did in many cities, to value liberty and hate slavery.

19. **Sparta and the Tyrants.**—The action of the Peloponnesian tyrants was hateful to Sparta. They had broken down the rule of the Dorians in their States, and raised the ancient population. Sparta feared that the same thing might be attempted in her own dominions; and therefore she put down tyrants, both in Peloponnesus and elsewhere, when a chance offered. Among others the nephew of Periander was driven out by Sparta. Sparta was now acknowledged as the leading State in Greece; most of the Peloponnesian cities were her allies, and sent troops when summoned, the Spartan kings acting as commanders of the united army.

20. **Colonies.**—During the period of the oligarchies and the tyrannies, owing to the discontent and poverty at home, bodies of men emigrated from many of the Greek cities, and founded new cities, called Colonies (*ἀποίκιαι*), in different parts of the Mediterranean Sea, and on the coast of the Black Sea. These colonies were often placed at spots where a trade had already begun with the natives, and were always on the coast, or but a short distance inland. From the beginning the colonies had greater freedom than the cities at home; and as they often had a more fertile territory or a better trade than was to be had in Greece, many of them became far richer and more powerful than the cities by which they had



THE GREEK COLONIES.

been founded. A colony was not subject to its mother-city, but paid it certain honours and kept up a friendly feeling, especially through the worship of the same gods. The colonies spread over the coast of South-West Italy and Sicily; and as the Greeks came to trade more and more in the east part of the Mediterranean, they drove out the Phœnician traders, who had at first had all the trade to themselves (p. 10). The Phœnicians could not resist the Greeks in these waters, but they resolved to keep the trade of the west part of the Mediterranean in their own hands, and not to let the Greeks take that also from them. Therefore the Phœnicians founded the warlike colony of Karthage on the African coast; and the Karthaginians, in alliance with the Etruscans of Italy, prevented the Greeks from settling in the west corner of Sicily or in Corsica, and from making any important settlements on the coast of Spain. If the spread of the Greek colonies had not thus been checked by the rise of Karthage, nearly the whole coast of the Mediterranean might have become Greek. As it was, the coast of Sicily, except in the west corner, became like a Greek country, the greatest of the colonies being Syracuse (p. 29) and Agrigentum. There was frequent war between the Sicilian Greeks and the Karthaginians. The coast of the south-western part of Italy was called *Magna Græcia*, from the number and importance of the Greek colonies there. They were scattered along this coast at intervals from Kumæ to Tarentum, and thrived by agriculture, trade, or fisheries. North of Kumæ, and on the east coast of Italy, there were no settlements. On the south coast of Gaul (France), Massilia (Marseillen) was a Greek colony, with others of less importance: on the African coast opposite Greece, Kyrēnē; and in Egypt, Naukrātis. Along the south coast of the Black Sea there was a line of colonies founded by Miletus; and on its west coast they stretched as far north as the Crimea, among savage neighbours,

and in a country where the winters are exceedingly cold. The prosperity of the Black Sea colonies depended on the corn trade, which is still the great trade of that district.

In most places where the Greeks settled, the natives of the country round them gradually gave up their own ways and began to live like Greeks, just as in places where the English settle the people begin to learn English habits and the English language. This was especially the case in South Italy and in Sicily, where the natives were akin to the Greeks by race. About B.C. 400, though the coast of Italy was chiefly Greek, the native Sikels in the interior were quite a distinct people : but in B.C. 70 the whole island had become Greek ; there was not a word except Greek to be heard anywhere.

21. Slavery.—In the Homeric times there were not very many slaves ; but as the Greeks grew more rich, and took more and more to living in cities, the number of slaves increased, and the citizens came to depend more on slave-labour. It became a common thing for the citizen to live in the town and leave the cultivation of his farm entirely to his slaves. Traders and merchants also employed slaves in their business, and there were great differences in the position of slaves. A slave might be employed as the clerk or secretary of his master, and be more like his friend than his servant ; or he might be treated as if he were a mere brute beast, and made to pass his life pulling at an oar. In reading the history of Greece we must bear in mind that we are reading the history of the masters only, not of the slaves ; and that all the greatness and interest of Greek life belonged only to a part of the population. There was another part—the slave-population—whose history, if it existed, would perhaps be too full of misery and suffering for us to bear to read it.

CHAPTER III.

ATTICA TO B.C. 500.

1. **Kings abolished at Athens.**—The inhabitants of Attica (map, p. 19) belonged to the Ionian branch of the Greeks (p. 14). There were originally several States in Attica, independent, and often at war with one another. Athens was the strongest of these: it did not, however, turn the inhabitants of the other States into its subjects, as Sparta did in Laconia, but united with them, so that Attica became a single State, and the noble families of the other States became nobles of Athens. This probably took place while Athens was still governed by kings, and the Athenians believed it to be the work of their hero Theseus. The kingly power was abolished very gradually. At first the nobles took away the priestly office of the king (p. 11), and called him *Archon* (ἄρχων), *Ruler*, instead of *Basileus* (*king*), which meant *Ruler and Priest together*; but the office of *Archon* was held for life, and son succeeded father. Next they determined that the *Archonship* should be held only for ten years; and at last, in B.C. 683, it was made a yearly office, and nine archons were made instead of one, so that there might be different men to judge and to command the army, instead of one man having all kinds of power.

2. **Noble Clans.**—The people of Attica were divided into three classes, the *Eupatridæ* or nobles, *Geōmōri*, or farmers, and *Demiurgi*, or workmen. The *Eupatridæ* were like a distinct race by themselves, although they were not foreign conquerors like the Dorians in the Peloponnesian States. They were clans supposed to be descended from heroes; they had the management of the sacred ceremonies, and kept the entire government of the State in their own hands. Some of the clans were more distinguished than the rest, and the greatest families in these took the lead in State affairs. When the history of Attica begins, the common people had no share in

the government. We shall see how the clans came to be thought of less importance, and the Athenians gained a better idea of what a State and its citizens ought to be.

3. Laws of Draco.—One of the afflictions of the common people was that justice was not done by the judges. There were no written laws. The nobles handed down precepts of law to one another by word of mouth; but the people complained that the archons, who were always nobles, gave judgment according to their own pleasure, and favoured their friends. It was therefore agreed that a citizen named Draco should draw up a *Code of Laws*, in order that everybody might know what the law was (B.C. 624). Draco did not make new laws, but ascertained the rules which the judges commonly went by, and wrote them down. The punishments in Draco's code seemed so severe to the later Greeks, that the word *Draconian* was used to express anything very strict or unmerciful; but in reality the punishments in all early laws are very severe (compare Matt. v. 38), and Draco's were not severer than others.

4. Kylon. **The curse of the Alkmæonidæ.** Soon after this, one of the nobles named Kylon tried to make himself tyrant (B.C. 612). Expecting that the common people would join him in overthrowing the Eupatridæ, he seized upon the *Acropolis*, the citadel of Athens. But the people gave him no help, and the government surrounded the Acropolis with troops. Kylon himself escaped; and his followers, when they were nearly dead with hunger, took refuge at the altars of the gods, which were on the Acropolis. The archon Megakles, who commanded the troops, promised them their lives if they would come away: but when they had left the altars his soldiers slaughtered them. This was a most impious crime against the gods, and the Athenians believed that a curse would fall upon their city. They called for vengeance upon the whole clan of Megakles, the Alkmæonidæ, who were thought to be all polluted by

his guilt. For years the nobles contended amongst themselves whether they should give up the Alkmæonidæ, or not; and the common people grew more and more violent against the government of the nobles. At length the Alkmæonidæ were persuaded by Solon, a wise Eupatrid, to submit to trial. They were found guilty of sacrilege, and banished from the city.

5. **Solon saves the Debtors.**—Solon was now greatly trusted, both by the nobles and the people. The nobles saw that if something were not done to relieve the distress and bankruptcy of the common people, a tyrant would arise (p. 32); and therefore they gave Solon authority to carry out whatever measures he thought best. The great misery of the people was debt. The farmers had borrowed money at very high interest from the wealthy, giving their farms in pledge for the payment of the debt. At the boundaries of every farm so *mortgaged*, pillars were set up as a witness, with the amount of the debt and the name of the lender cut upon them. The debt grew greater and greater every year from the heavy interest; the farmer lost all hope of ever being able to pay, and was now only like a labourer on the farm which had once been really his own. The debtor who had no farm, and who could not pay his debt, was in still worse case, for he became the actual slave of his creditor, and might be sold (comp. 2 Kings iv. 1; Nehemiah v. 3—5). Thus the free farmers, the Geomori, were disappearing altogether. Some were sold abroad as slaves, others were working at home as serfs, or struggling in miserable poverty. To save the State, Solon was compelled to take very strong measures. He ordered that the common silver coins, called *drachmæ*, should be made of lighter weight, so that 100 new ones should be worth only 73 old ones, and that the new *drachmæ* should be accepted as if they were equal to the old ones, in payment of debts. Thus, a man who owed 100 old *drachmæ*

would pay it by 100 new drachmæ, which were worth only 73 old ones, and would really have his debt reduced by 27. Farmers who owed money to the State were freed from their debt altogether, and made a fresh start. Many persons who had been sold abroad as slaves were brought back and set free; and Solon ordered that from henceforth no Athenian should be made the slave of another for debt (comp. Nehemiah v. 6—13). These measures did great good to the farmers; and Solon's poems tell us how the mortgage-pillars disappeared from the country.

6. Constitution of Solon. Timocracy.—

Solon was also given authority to make a new constitution and new laws for the State. Till now the noble clans had been everything. It was Solon who first made Athens a State in which a man might take a part as citizen without belonging to one of those clans. The ancient Homeric assembly of all the people (p. 12) had perhaps never died out in Athens, but it had never gained any authority. Solon first made this assembly (*ἐκκλησία*) a real part of the State. He secured to it the *election of the archons*, the *right of passing laws*, and the *right of calling magistrates to account for what they had done while in office*. Every free-born native of Attica had a vote in the assembly, whether he belonged to one of the clans or not. But Solon did not intend that anyone who chose should get up in the assembly and propose a law: he established a council (*βουλή*) of 400 to prepare the business that was to come before the assembly, and nothing was to be proposed in the assembly that had not been agreed to by the council. The councillors (*βουλευται*) were to be elected yearly by the people.

Solon also made a new division of the citizens, distinct from the old clan divisions. He divided all the natives of Attica into four classes, according to the amount of land which they possessed. To the richer classes he gave the greatest share in the government, but he also required them to pay

heavier taxes, and to do more service for the State. Men of the first or richest class alone could hold the archonship; and thus the rich Eupatridæ, who best understood government, would still be at the head of the State. The lowest class could not be members of the council or hold any office; they had only their votes in the assembly. They paid no taxes; and, when they were called out as soldiers (p. 15), they had not to find themselves arms, whereas the first three classes had to provide themselves with a full suit of armour, or to serve as cavalry-men on horses of their own. A constitution which, like Solon's, gives power in proportion to wealth, is called a *Timocracy* (τιμοκρατία, *τιμή*, rating, κράτος, power). Hitherto birth alone could give a man power in Athens: now, though the greatest part of the first class would no doubt be Eupatridæ, any Athenian who possessed a good estate might hold the highest offices; and the whole people, though they did not actually take part in the government, had some control over it through their electing the archons and calling them to account.

7. *Areopagus*.—There was a very ancient assembly of nobles which met on the hill Areopagus, and was itself called the *Areopagus*. It had originally judged in cases of murder. Solon gave it more power, and arranged that the archons of every year, if approved by the Areopagus, should become members of the Areopagus for the rest of their lives. Thus the Areopagus would be composed of the most experienced men among the nobles. Solon gave it the right to forbid any law to be passed which it should think dangerous to the State, and the right to warn or punish citizens who lived in a manner unbecoming Athenians, or who brought up their children badly. The Areopagus did not take any regular part in the government, but was held in great reverence, and was the pride of the Eupatridæ.¹

¹ The meeting on the Areopagus before which St. Paul spoke was probably a mere gathering of citizens with no authority, (Acts xvii.)

8. **Solon's Laws.**—Solon was also charged to draw up a new code of laws for Athens in the place of those of Draco. In all countries in very early times the family or the clan had an authority over their members which now belongs only to the Law of the State. The father had great power over his children, and could even put them to death (comp. Deuteronomy xxi. 18); and the property of those who had no children went to their clan when they died. Now Solon thought that the life and liberty of children ought not to depend on the will of their fathers, and that the clan ought not to have any claim on a man's property at his death. Therefore he made a law that the father should not sell or pawn his children, and that people without children should have the right to leave their property at their death to whom they chose. The son was obliged to support his father in old age, but not unless his father had given him an education. Solon required all citizens to take an active part in protecting the State from mischief, as there was no army or police to do so (p. 15); and therefore he punished any citizen who, when troubles arose, should not resolutely take one side or the other. Solon ended his work by pardoning all who had brought themselves into disgrace during the late troubles; and the Alkmæonidæ returned to Athens (B.C. 594).

9. **Nomothêtæ.**—The evils which existed in Athens were common in other Greek States; and in many of them, just as in Athens, power was given to a single man to draw up an entirely new set of Laws, which should set the citizens free from their oppression and discontent, and enable them to live together in concord. These men were called *Nomothêtæ* (*νομοθῆται*), *Legislators*; and some of them performed their task with great wisdom and success, and really gave a new life to their States. More is known, however, about the laws of Solon than about the laws of any of the other *Nomothêtæ*.

19. **Factions. Pisistrātus Tyrant.**—In spite of Solon's great improvements, troubles continued in Attica. The most powerful of the nobles were at enmity ; and, as Attica was a large district for a single State, the inhabitants of different parts of it were easily stirred up against one another. There were three parties,—the men of the plains, the men of the coast, and the men of the mountains. The last were the poorest and most dissatisfied ; and the cleverest of the nobles, Pisistrātus, put himself at their head. The leader of the men of the coast was Megākles, an Alkmæonid, the grandson of the Megakles who had killed Kylon's followers. One market-day, when the town was full of poor country-people, Pisistratus smeared himself with blood, and drove into the market-place, declaring that he had been almost killed by his enemies on account of his zeal for the people. A friend, with whom Pisistratus had arranged the whole plan, proposed to the people that they should give Pisistratus a guard of fifty men, armed with clubs. Solon in vain warned the people against it ; the guard was given, and gradually increased to 400. Then, when Pisistratus felt sure of his power, he seized the Acropolis, and made himself tyrant (B.C. 560). He was twice driven out by the parties of the coast and the plain ; but in B.C. 545 he made himself tyrant for the third time, and thenceforth reigned in peace till his death (B.C. 527). Though he surrounded himself with a foreign guard, he governed very gently, and allowed Solon's constitution to remain in force, only providing that the highest offices should be held by men of his own family. He established religious festivals in which all the people could join : he beautified Athens with temples and public buildings ; he improved the roads, and laid on water by an aqueduct. He also brought living poets to Athens, and collected copies of the older poetry from all parts of Greece, employing learned men to clear it from mistakes and confusions.

11. Hippias and Hipparchus.—After the death of Pisistratus (B.C. 527), his eldest son Hippias succeeded him, and governed mildly: but in B.C. 514 Hipparchus, the brother of Hippias, affronted the sister of a young citizen, named Harmodius, and Harmodius, with his friend Aristogiton, determined to kill both the tyrant and his brother. They succeeded in killing Hipparchus, but Hippias saved himself by presence of mind, and Harmodius and Aristogiton perished. After this Hippias became suspicious and cruel, killing and ill-treating the citizens.

12. End of the Tyranny.—Since the return of Pisistratus in B.C. 545 the Alkmæonidæ had been in exile. Being very wealthy, and wishing to clear themselves from their bad name by an act of piety, they undertook for a certain sum to rebuild the temple of Delphi, which had been burnt down, and though the agreement was only for common stone, they faced the temple with fine marble. This gained them the favour of the oracle; and as they knew that so long as the family of Pisistratus reigned they would never be allowed to return to Athens, they bribed the priestess of Delphi, whenever the Spartans should send to consult the oracle, to make only this answer, "Athens must be freed." The Spartans, finding that, whatever they asked, the god would give them no other advice, determined to do as he bade them. They sent an army to turn out Hippias; and when this was defeated they sent another under Kleomēnēs, king of Sparta. The children of Hippias fell into the hands of Kleomenes, and in order to recover them, Hippias agreed to leave Attica. This was the end of the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ (B.C. 510). The Athenians remembered the last four cruel years of Hippias with horror, and paid honours to the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton, as if it had been they who had freed the city.

13. Constitution of Kleisthēnēs. Democracy.—Now that Hippias was gone, the struggle of

parties began afresh. Many of the nobles, under the lead of Isagōras, wished to restore the old government of the nobles, as it had been before Solon; the Alkmæonidæ, headed by Kleisthēnēs, the son of Megakles, took the opposite side. This Kleisthenes was named after Kleisthenes, the Tyrant of Sikyon, whose daughter Megakles had married. It was he who had bribed the priestess of Delphi; and now, whether out of ambition or real love for Athens, he took up the cause of the common people, and gave them more to do with the government.

14. Tribes and Demes.—There was an ancient division of the people into four tribes, called the *Ionic Tribes*. Kleisthenes abolished this division, because it made the common people look up to the nobles of their tribe; and instead of having the people divided according to birth, he divided the land into a great number of districts or parishes, called *Demes* (δῆμοι), and then made ten new tribes by putting into a single tribe the inhabitants of several Demes at a distance from one another. Thus one of the new tribes would not be anything like a clan: the people in it would come from different parts of Attica, and would not be related to one another by birth; and the members of a single clan would be in many different tribes. Kleisthenes hoped by this means to prevent the great nobles from raising parties to support them, and also to put an end to the division of the country into districts like those of the plain, the coast, and the mountain.

15. Council.—In Solon's constitution, the council of 400 was composed of 100 from each of the four old *Ionic tribes*: Kleisthenes had the council to be elected by his ten new tribes, 50 from each, making 500 councillors in all. He did not interfere with Solon's division into classes according to property, or with the privileges of the richer classes; but when he made his division into Demes, he included among the citizens every man then living in Attica, except slaves, whether

born of Attic parents or not. Thus a number of traders and settlers, called *aliens* (μέτοικοι) received Athenian citizenship; and the people felt more than before that they had a real share in the State. The members of each clan still kept up their religious ceremonies, and a feeling of pride in their clan; but for all purposes of government the people acted together in their Demes and new tribes.

16. **Assembly.**—Kleisthenes wished the public assembly (ἐκκλησία) to take a greater part in the government than it had under Solon: and since no measure could be introduced in the assembly that had not been drawn up by the council, Kleisthenes had to make the council a more business-like body than it had hitherto been. As it is impossible that 500 people can transact business methodically all together he divided the council into *committees* (πρυτάνεις). Each committee was composed of the men elected by one of the new tribes, so that no great nobleman could hope to get a committee filled with his clansmen. The council and the assembly now began to take an increasing part in the government.

17. **Stratēgi.**—A new and important office was created in connection with the tribes. Each of the ten tribes was to choose a *Stratēgus*, or General (στρατηγός), and the Ten Generals were to hold command of the army in turn, each for a day. One of the archons, called the Polemarchus (πόλεμος, *war*, ἄρχων), commanded with them. By degrees the Strategi gained the management of the foreign affairs of the State.

18. **Juries.**—About the same time the assembly was divided into courts or juries, in order that the chief cases might be tried before a jury of citizens instead of being decided by the archons or the Areopagus as before.

19. **Ostrakism.**—Kleisthenes saw that all over Greece ambitious men had been able to make themselves tyrants because the States had no armies or police ready to defend the constitution (p. 15); and

he feared that a tyrant might rise again in Athens. Therefore he established a custom called *ostrakism*, by which the citizens might get rid of a man whom they thought likely to make himself tyrant, or to throw the State again into violent struggles. First of all the council and the assembly had to decide that the State really was in danger; then the citizens were summoned to meet on a certain day, and to write each upon a ticket (*ὄστρακον*) the name of any person whom he thought dangerous to the State. If the same name was written on 6,000 tickets, that person had to go into exile for ten years; but he did not lose his property, and he might return with all his rights as a citizen at the end of the ten years.

20. Lot.—Another device was made either at this time or soon afterwards to prevent ambitious men from raising parties in the State, and to give a better chance to less powerful men. When the candidates for the archonship had given in their names, instead of the people voting which of those who had given in their names should be archons, they cast lots (*κλήρος*). Thus the most that an ambitious man could do would be to put down his name as a candidate: voting being abolished, it would be of no use for him to collect a party to support him. The most important officers of all, however, the Strategoi, were never chosen by lot; for great mischief might have happened if the lot had fallen on a man unfit to be general.

21. Spartans interfere.—The changes of Kleisthenes gave the people great power; and the constitution of Athens now began to be a *Democracy*, or *Government of the People* (*δημοκρατία*, *δῆμος*, *people*, *κράτος*, *power*), instead of a Timocracy (p. 40). Many of the nobles, headed by Isagōras, opposed Kleisthenes as strongly as they could; and when Isagoras found that he could not resist the reforms of Kleisthenes, he applied to Kleomēnēs, king of Sparta, for help, saying that Kleisthenes was about to make himself tyrant, and that he would be the enemy of the

Dorians, like his grandfather, Kleisthenes of Sikyon (p. 33). Kleomenes was a very ambitious king, and wished that Sparta should exercise control over Athens ; therefore, in order to get rid of Kleisthenes, he summoned the Athenians to expel the Alkmæonidæ, the clan of Kleisthenes, on account of their curse (p. 38). Kleisthenes at once left Athens ; and Kleomenes marched into Athens with a small force, and expelled 700 families whom Isagoras pointed out to him as *democratical*. He then tried to dissolve the council of 500. But the whole people rose in arms. The troops of Kleomenes were overpowered and driven into the citadel. The Athenians allowed them to retire unhurt, but put to death the citizens who had joined them. Kleomenes now summoned the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, and invaded Attica, determining to make Isagoras tyrant, because Isagoras was willing to subject Athens to Sparta. He did not tell the allies what his purpose was ; but when they reached Eleusis in Attica, the allies discovered it, and refused to go any further, so that the army broke up. Kleomenes had also persuaded the Thebans and the citizens of Chalkis, in Eubœa, to declare war on Athens. When the Athenians saw the army of Kleomenes break up, they marched against the Thebans, and found them on the shore of Eurîpus (map, p. 19) waiting for the Chalkidians. The Athenians attacked and defeated the Theban army, and the moment the battle was over they crossed the Eurîpus, and won so complete a victory over the Chalkidians on the same day, that the whole state of Chalkis was at their mercy. They took the land of the Chalkidian nobles, and settled 4,000 Athenian farmers upon it. The Spartans were now more jealous than ever of Athens. They discovered that the priestess of Delphi had been bribed to make them expel Hippias, and they determined to humble Athens and restore Hippias. But after what had happened in the last campaign they dared not conceal their object from the allies. There

fore they summoned deputies from all parts of Peloponnesus, and tried to persuade them to join in restoring Hippias. But the Corinthian deputy Sosiklēs reproached the Spartans, who had always been the enemies of tyrants, with the change in their conduct, and reminded them of what Corinth had suffered from Periander. The assembly applauded Sosikles: the Spartans saw that they could do nothing, and gave up the business.

Thus the Athenians had upheld their liberties and gained two brilliant victories over the Thebans and the Chalkidians who would have helped to restore the tyranny. The spirit of the citizens rose high. The changes of Kleisthenes had abated the rivalries of the rich, and the poor saw that they had a share in the State, and felt no wish to have the tyrants back. Athens was more at one with herself than she had ever been before. In the coming Persian wars the Athenians held together in spite of traitors; and both rich and poor did their duty when the time came.

CHAPTER IV.

THE IONIC REVOLT AND PERSIAN WARS.

I. **The Ionic Colonies conquered by Lydia.**—The Greek colonies in Asia Minor were all coast towns, and did not try to conquer the interior of the country. Nor did the kings of the inland countries, such as Phrygia and Lydia (map, p. 10), at first attack the Greek settlers, but allowed them to keep possession of the coast in peace; and they grew rich and prosperous long before the cities of European Greece (p. 33). The most important colonies were the Ionic. They were twelve independent cities; and though they had a common religious festival, and felt themselves to be a distinct body from the Dorians and Æolians, they did not act together; nor had any city such a leadership among them as Sparta had in Peloponnesus. So long as no powerful enemy attacked them, the Ionians did not feel the evils of their disunion: but

about the year B.C. 720 a new line of kings arose in Lydia, who determined to make Lydia a great empire, and to conquer all the coast. These kings made war upon the Ionian cities one after another; and at last, about B.C. 550, King Croesus made himself master of them all. But Croesus had no wish to injure or destroy any Greek city. He wished only to make them a part of his empire. The Lydian kings had come to understand and like the ways of the Greeks; they consulted the Greek oracles and sent presents to the temples, and, even when at war, they respected the holy places of the Greeks. Croesus only required the cities to pay him a moderate tribute, and to acknowledge him as sovereign; in all other respects he allowed them to manage their own affairs. He was fond of everything Greek; he welcomed Greek artists and travellers to his court; and if the empire of Lydia had continued, Greek habits would perhaps have soon spread over Asia Minor.

But Lydia was about to be overthrown by a real Asiatic monarchy, which hated and despised Greek ways: and in order to understand the events that were now coming, we must turn away from Greece for a moment, and go far back into the history of the Asiatic nations.

2. **Nineveh.**—Before B.C. 1000 the kings of Nineveh had conquered the neighbouring nations about the Euphrates, and had made Assyria a great empire. In the height of its power Assyria ruled as far as Lydia on the west, and on the east perhaps as far as the river Indus (first map). But about B.C. 750 Babylon and Media revolted, and made themselves independent kingdoms.

It was after this, while Nineveh and Babylon were distinct kingdoms, that the Jews were carried into captivity, Israel by the King of Assyria (2 Kings xvii. 6), Judah by the King of Babylon (2 Kings xxv.).

3. **Medes.**—The Medes, who had revolted from Nineveh, were a brave people living in the highlands

east of the Euphrates; and they united the neighbouring mountain-tribes under their rule, including the Persians to the south. The fourth king of Media, Kyaxares, allied himself with Nabonassar, king of Babylon, against Nineveh; and in B.C. 606 they took the great city and utterly destroyed it (Nahum iii.). As the Medes were eager for still further conquests, and did not dare to attack Babylon itself, they had to turn towards Asia Minor, and there they conquered everything until they met the Lydians. The Lydian and Median armies were drawn up for battle, when a sudden darkness came over the earth through an eclipse of the sun. They took this for a sign, and made peace, agreeing that the river Halys should be the boundary between the Lydian and Median empires (B.C. 585). Crœsus, therefore, in B.C. 550, was ruling over the country between the Ægæan Sea and the Halys.

4. **Persians.**—Soon after the conquests of the Medes had stopped, the Persian nation under Cyrus rose against the Medes, and put themselves at the head of the great Median empire (B.C. 559). Crœsus knew that the Persians would begin to conquer afresh, and therefore he prepared for war. He made alliance with Belshazzar, king of Babylon, and with Amāsis, king of Egypt, and sent to the Delphic oracle to ask whether he should declare war on Cyrus. The oracle made an ingenious answer, and bade Crœsus ally himself with Sparta. Sparta promised him help; but without waiting for this, Crœsus invaded Kappadokia, and fought a drawn battle with Cyrus (B.C. 547). Then he retired to Sardis, the capital of Lydia, and sent word to all his allies to have their troops at Sardis at the end of five months. But Cyrus was more ready than Crœsus supposed. He marched straight upon Sardis, defeated Crœsus, and took the city before help could arrive. All Lydia submitted to the conqueror, and the Ionic coast-cities offered to submit, if Cyrus would continue the privileges which Crœsus had

granted them. Cyrus refused ; and the cities had to decide whether they would submit to the Persian on his own terms or fight for their liberty. They determined to fight, and sent to Sparta to ask for help. Sparta gave them none. The time for submission was past, and the towns were besieged one after another by Harpāgus, the general of Cyrus.

5. War in Ionia.—Never had the Greeks seen such a terrible enemy as the Persians, who now attacked them. In the Lydian wars they had seen a fine cavalry, but the Persians had new troops and contrivances of every kind. Their archers shot the defenders of the walls. They brought up machines for regular sieges ; they surrounded the towns with trenches, that no one might get in or out ; they built up mounds against the walls, or threw the walls down by undermining them. The Lydians had spared holy places ; but the Persians, like the armies of Mohammed in later times, were believers in one God, and hated all the works of idolaters : and all through their wars they exasperated the Greeks by destroying their temples. The Ionians saw that all was lost ; and some of them showed a noble love of liberty by abandoning their homes rather than submit to the conqueror. Many of the citizens of Teos sailed away to Thrace, and founded Abdēra : the citizens of Phokæa, having made a day's truce with the army besieging them, employed the time in putting their wives and children on board ship, and then sailed away, leaving an empty city to the Persians. After a time some of them fell home-sick and returned ; the rest, after many adventures, settled at Elĕa, in the south of Italy (p. 35). The other towns were all reduced by the Persians, and, when once conquered, they were not badly treated. But though their prosperity continued for the moment, their wisest citizen, Bias of Priēnē, told them that they were now at the mercy of Persia, and that it was the want of union which had cost them their liberty. He tried to persuade them, while they

still had their ships, to follow the example of the Phokæans,—to sail away to Sardinia, and there to found one great city in common. But the other Ionian cities had not the spirit of the Phokæans; they thought that their trade and wealth might be as great as ever, although they were subject to the Persians, and they refused to follow the advice of Bias.

6. Persian Empire becomes a Naval Power.

The whole coast of Asia Minor was reduced by Harpagus, and the islands of Chios and Lesbos submitted, although the Persians had as yet no fleet to reach them with (about B.C. 540). While Harpagus was conquering the Greeks, Cyrus himself besieged and took Babylon (Isaiah xlv.; Jerem. li.). It was now that the Jews were allowed to return to Judæa (Ezra i.). When Cyrus was dead (B.C. 525), Phœnicia submitted to his son Kambyses, so that the Persians could now compel two maritime nations, the Phœnicians and the Ionians, to supply them with a fleet, and could therefore think of making conquests beyond the seas. Kambyses added Egypt and Cyprus to the Persian empire, and died in B.C. 522.

7. Darius sets the Empire in order.—

After Kambyses, an impostor was set up as king of Persia, pretending that he was Smerdis, the younger son of Cyrus, who had really been put to death by Kambyses. He was discovered at the end of eight months, and killed, and Darius, a kinsman of Cyrus, was made king (B.C. 521). Darius was a wise ruler. When he came to the throne a great part of the empire was in revolt, and he saw that if it was to be held together there must be a more regular government. Therefore he divided the empire into twenty provinces, called *Satrāpies*, and had all the land in the empire measured, that he might fix the tax that each satrapy was to pay yearly. He made Susa in Media the centre of government (Esther i. 1, 2), and laid out roads from Susa to all parts of the empire, and made arrangements all along these roads for taking people

engaged on the king's business quickly from one place to another. Coins called *Dariks* were struck, which passed current everywhere. Thus the countries from the Indus to the Ægæan Sea were now governed on one system, and Darius knew what was going on in the most distant parts of the empire. In the conquered countries any native government that seemed likely to work well and submissively was maintained under the *Satrap* or Persian governor of the province. Thus in Judæa Zerubbabel and Joshua governed under the satrap of Syria (Haggai i.) ; and in Ionia Darius saw that the rule of tyrants, which was common there, would be likely to keep the cities in obedience to Persia. Therefore he gave his protection to a tyrant in each of the cities.

8. **Scythian Expedition.**—When Darius had put the empire in order, he made an expedition against the Scythians in Europe, north of the Danube (B.C. 510) ; and now it was seen how important the conquest of Ionia had been to Persia ; for Darius had the Ionian tyrants to raise a fleet of 600 ships, and join him in the expedition. His army marched to the shore of the Bosphorus, one of the straits that divide Europe from Asia. There a bridge of boats had been made ready by Mandröklēs, an engineer of Samos, and the Persian army marched over it into Europe. From the Bosphorus, they marched northward, through Thrace, till they came to the river Danube. Meantime the Ionian fleet, under the command of the tyrants, had sailed from the Bosphorus to the mouth of the Danube, and had made a bridge of boats across the river some way inland. Darius crossed over this bridge into Scythia with his army, and commanded the tyrants to remain at the bridge and keep guard over it for two months. But at the end of two months Darius did not return. Instead of meeting the Persian army and fighting a battle, the Scythians, who were a wandering people without fixed homes, had fallen back before their invaders, so as to

allure them further and further into the country ; and the Greeks heard that Darius and his army had lost their way in the plains, and were now retreating towards the Danube, attacked by Scythian bowmen, and in miserable plight. When this news came, one of the tyrants, Miltiādēs, ruler of the Thracian Chersonēsus, an Athenian by birth, proposed to the other tyrants that they should destroy the bridge, and leave Darius and his army to perish by famine in Scythia. But Histiaeus, the tyrant of Miletus, reminded the tyrants that it was the Persians who kept them on their thrones, and that if the Persian empire were destroyed they would be driven out of the cities by the people. Therefore the tyrants refused to break down the bridge, and the counsel of Histiaeus saved Darius and his army.

9. Persian Empire extended as far as Thessaly.—Darius returned to Sardis in safety, and left Megabāzus, a Persian general, with 80,000 men, to conquer that part of Thrace which had not yet submitted, and to make a regular Satrapy in Europe. Megabazus subdued all Thrace, and sent ambassadors to Amyntas, king of Macedonia, summoning him to acknowledge Darius as his master. Amyntas gave earth and water, which was the Persian token of submission, so that Macedonia was added to the subject states, and the Persian empire now extended in Europe from the Danube to Mount Olympus, the boundary between Macedonia and Thessaly. To reward Histiaeus for preserving the bridge, Darius gave him the country of Myrkinus in Thrace on the river Strymon. And now possessing both Miletus and Myrkinus, Histiaeus began to make great plans for conquest. But the satrap Megabazus discovered his intentions, and warned Darius that Histiaeus was preparing to make himself independent: so Darius sent for Histiaeus, and under pretence of friendship took him to live at the court at Susa, allowing Aristagōras, the son-in-law of Histiaeus, to reign as tyrant at Miletus in his stead.

10. **Ionians Revolt.**—Aristagoras was just as ambitious as Histiaëus, and he soon saw an opportunity for extending his power. The nobles of the island of Naxos had been driven out by the people, and asked Aristagoras for help (B.C. 502). Aristagoras thought that if he restored the nobles he would be master of the island: but as Naxos was too powerful for him to attack it by himself, he went to Artaphernes, the Satrap of his district, and proposed that the Persians should help him to conquer Naxos, and add not only Naxos but other islands to the Persian empire. Artaphernes agreed, and gave Aristagoras a fleet of two hundred ships. But the Persian commander of the fleet quarrelled with Aristagoras, and the enterprize failed. Aristagoras now feared the anger of Artaphernes, and began to think of revolting. Just at the same time Histiaëus, who wished to be dismissed from Susa, sent Aristagoras word to revolt, thinking that he himself would be sent by Darius to put down the rebels, and would so regain his liberty. Aristagoras assembled the people, proclaimed that he would be tyrant no longer, and persuaded the people of Miletus and the other cities to revolt from Persia. The tyrants were deposed and liberty proclaimed in all the cities (B.C. 500). The Æolian and Dorian colonies and the island of Cyprus joined the insurrection.

11. **Athenians burn Sardis.**—Knowing the great power of the Persians, Aristagoras crossed over to Greece to seek for help. The Spartans refused it, but Athens immediately sent twenty ships, and Eretria in Eubœa sent five. Their troops united with the revolted Ionians, and marched suddenly on Sardis, where Artaphernes was, and set fire to the town. But the Persian forces gathered; the Greeks could not hold Sardis, and were attacked and defeated as they were retreating to the coast. The Athenians returned home, and the whole force of Persia was collected against the revolted cities.

12. **Battle of Ladē** (B.C. 495).—The war was

long and desperate. The smaller cities were besieged first, and made stubborn resistance. Four years had passed before the Persians collected their forces by land and by sea to blockade Miletus, the greatest of them all. Then all the cities that were still untaken held council together; and as they could not beat off the besieging army by land, they resolved to embark all their troops on ships, and try to keep the Persians from surrounding Miletus by sea also. Altogether they mustered 353 ships. The fleet was stationed off the island of Ladē in front of Miletus (map, p. 10). Then the Persians brought up the navy of Phœnicia, 600 ships: and when the hearts of the Greeks sank at the number of the enemy, a brave Phokæan, named Dionysius, promised them certain victory if they would do what he should tell them. The Ionians agreed; and for seven days Dionysius made them practise for the battle from morning till night. But the Ionians were a pleasure-loving race, and were not used to discipline and obedience. On the eighth day they lost all patience, and left the ships, and made themselves comfortable under the shade in the island. In the meantime, by order of the Persian generals, the former tyrants were trying to persuade the leaders of their cities to desert when the battle should be fought, under promise of pardon from Persia; and the Persians, trusting that the tyrants had succeeded, ordered the Phœnician fleet to attack. The Greeks were again on board their ships. And now, when the Greek and the Phœnician navies fronted one another in order of battle, and the last great struggle for the freedom of Ionia was at hand, a shameful sight was seen. Before a blow was struck, forty-nine out of the sixty ships of Samos sailed away. The Lesbians followed, and after them many others. The crews of Miletus and Chios had to fight the whole Phœnician fleet almost alone; Dionysius was one of the few who did not desert them. They fought with noble bravery, but in vain. The battle of Lade was the death-blow

to Ionia; and the disgrace was as great as the ruin. It showed to all the world how incapable the Ionians were of making any sacrifice for their common cause, and how destitute of the sense of honour and duty.

13. Vengeance of the Persians.—Soon after the battle of Lade, Miletus was taken by storm (B.C. 495), and the Persians took terrible vengeance for the burning of Sardis. They killed most of the men; the women and children were carried into captivity; the holy places burnt to the ground.

After Miletus the Persians took all the cities on the coast, and in the neighbouring islands, and in the Thracian Chersonese. Everywhere they carried fire and the sword: still there cannot have been the wholesale slaughter which the Greeks represent, for the cities were soon again populous and thriving.

14. First Persian Expedition against Greece (B.C. 493).—Darius now intended to punish Athens and Eretria for their share in burning Sardis. A Persian army, commanded by Mardonius, crossed the Hellespont, and marched towards Greece along the coast of Thrace, the fleet accompanying it. But when the fleet was sailing round the promontory of Mount Athos, a hurricane arose and destroyed 300 ships with 20,000 men. At the same time the Thracians attacked Mardonius, and he turned back in shame to Asia.

15. Second Expedition (B.C. 490).—Then Darius assembled a new army and a new fleet; but before invading Greece he sent envoys to the islands to demand earth and water, in token of submission. Most of them gave it, including the powerful island of Ægina, which was at war with Athens, and would gladly have seen Athens ruined. In B.C. 490 the fleet of Darius sailed into the Ægæan, with an army on board under the command of Datis and Artaphernes, and landed them first at Naxos, which had refused to submit. Naxos had defended itself successfully against the fleet of Artaphernes in B.C. 505 (p. 56); but the bravest men were terrified by the destruction of Ionia,

and the Naxians fled from their city into the mountains. The Persians utterly destroyed the town with all its sanctuaries. Then they sailed to Eubœa, and besieged Eretria. On the sixth day the gates were opened by traitors. The Persians razed the city to the ground, and sent most of the citizens into Asia in chains.

16. **Marathon (B.C. 490).**—From Eretria the Persians crossed the Euripus, and landed on the plain of Marathon, twenty-two miles from Athens. The ruin of the Athenians was certain if they waited for their town to be besieged: nothing but a victory in the field could save them from slaughter and captivity. They marched out, 9,000 heavy armed men (p. 41), under the command of the Polemarch and the ten Strategi (p. 46), and encamped on the hills overlooking the plain of Marathon. The army of the Persians that had wrought such ruin upon Ionia, the army which no Greeks had ever resisted with success, lay below them on the plain between the mountains and the sea. Sparta had promised help, but delayed sending it, and the Athenians were alone in their desperate peril. At this moment the little army of the citizens of Plataea, only a thousand in all, who had lately had protection given them by the Athenians, came to share their fate. Such courage and resolution filled the Athenians with admiration, and were never forgotten. Still the whole number of the army was only 10,000; and five of the generals thought that they ought to wait till help came from Sparta. The leader of the other five was Miltiades, (p. 55), who, after escaping from the Persians, had been elected Strategus in Athens. Miltiades knew that there were traitors among the citizens, and feared that they would break up the army if fighting were delayed. Therefore, though the Persians were ten times as numerous, he urged immediate battle: and when the votes of the ten Strategi were equally divided, the Polemarch Kallimachus gave his casting-

vote for battle. The generals gave up each his own day's command (p. 46) to Miltiades ; and Miltiades, when the right time had come, drew up the army in line for battle. After the generals had addressed their tribesmen the battle signal was given, and the whole army, raising the battle-cry, charged down the hill upon the Persians. In the struggle the centre of the Greek line was driven back ; but the two ends carried everything before them, and turned and attacked the Persians in the centre. The Persians gave way, and fled for refuge to their ships, or were driven into the marshes by the shore. Six thousand Persians, and no more than 192 Athenians, fell in the battle. Either before or immediately after the battle a bright shield was seen raised on a mountain by Athenian traitors, as a signal to the Persians that there were no troops in the city. Miltiades instantly marched back to Athens. Soon after he reached it the Persian fleet approached, expecting to find Athens without troops. When they saw the men who had just fought at Marathon drawn up on the beach ready to fight them again, they sailed away, and the whole armament returned to Asia.

The battle of Marathon was glorious to Athens and Plataea ; and though the number of Greeks who fought and died in it was small, it is one of the most important battles in all history : for, had it not been won, Athens must have been captured by Persia ; and the rest of Greece would probably have submitted. Greece would have become a Persian province ; and the history of Europe, instead of being the history of free and progressing nations, might have been like the history of Asia,—a history of oppressors and their slaves. It was an act of splendid courage in the Athenians to face that army which had overthrown Lydia, Babylon, and Ionia : and it shows the insight of Miltiades into the differences between soldiers, that, after seeing the Ionian Greeks one after another overthrown by Persia, he should yet have


been convinced that the 10,000 Athenians would be a match for the whole Persian army.

On the day after the battle 2,000 Spartans reached Athens. They had delayed marching until the full moon, because this was their religious custom. But had Sparta really meant to defend Athens, it would have sent more than 2,000 men, whether they waited for the full moon or not. Thus Sparta lost the glory of a share in the first victory over Persia.

17. Miltiades.—Greece was saved ; but the general who had saved it perished miserably. Miltiades had been twenty years a tyrant, and he now wished to employ the forces of Athens like a tyrant instead of a citizen-general. He persuaded the people to give him command of a fleet, without telling them for what purpose ; and out of private enmity he attacked the island of Paros. But the Parians defended themselves bravely, and Miltiades found that he could do nothing. At last a priestess, who wished to betray the city, sent word to Miltiades to come secretly to her temple. Miltiades tried to climb into the temple by night, but fell and wounded his thigh. And now, after twenty-six days' command, he returned to Athens with nothing done. He was accused of deceiving the people, and sentenced to pay a heavy fine. His property was in the hands of the Persians ; he could pay nothing. His wound mortified, and he died in dishonour.

18. Themistōklēs.—After the battle of Marathon the Persians retreated from Greece, and Athens was left to itself. Its two leading citizens were now Themistokles and Aristides. Themistokles was the cleverest man of his time. He was wonderfully quick and wise in foreseeing what was going to happen ; and when he had determined to have anything done, no difficulty was so great but that he could find some ingenious plan for making things go as he wished. While the other Athenians were satisfied with having beaten the Persians at Marathon, Themistokles felt sure that Persia would attack Greece again. He

thought with himself how Athens might be made as powerful as possible: and as he looked on the jutting coast of Piræus, four miles from Athens, with its bays lying as if they had been made for harbours, and thought of the greatness of the Ionic maritime towns before their destruction, and of the multitude of islands and coast towns in Greece which might all be controlled by one strong fleet, he saw that if Athens would take to the sea it would be possible to give her such a power as had never been imagined. He saw that Athens might bring a far greater force against Persia



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by sea than she ever could by land; and that the leadership of Greece would pass from inland Sparta and its army to a State which could control the coasts and islands with a fleet.

19. Athenians build a Fleet.—Fortunately for the plans of Themistokles there was constant war between Athens and the island of Ægina (p. 58). The Athenians could not overcome Ægina without a powerful navy; and this made them listen to the counsel of Themistokles, and agree to spend the produce of the public silver mines in building 200 triremes. But Themistokles knew that the fleet could never thrive

unless a great maritime business and population arose. He therefore did everything to attract the people to a seafaring life, and to encourage trade by sea. Hitherto the Athenian ships had put in at the east corner of the open bay of Phalērun. Now the safe inclosed bays around Piræus were made into good harbours, and a busy trading town, called Piræus, grew up on their shore. In B.C. 490 Athens had hardly any navy; in B.C. 480 she had a fleet of 200 triremes, the most powerful fleet in Greece.

20. Aristides.—Aristides disapproved of the whole plan of Themistokles. He thought that if Athens had beaten the Persians once by land she might beat them by land again. The soldiers who had fought at Marathon were all owners of land (p. 41): but, if a fleet were formed, it would be chiefly manned by poor people who had no land; and Aristides knew that whoever had the chief share in fighting on behalf of Athens would also have the chief share in its government. If the strength of Athens lay in its fleet, the poor people who served in the fleet would get the upper hand in the State. A maritime and trading population would grow up, fond of adventure and change; and the good old ways, he thought, would be forsaken. In wishing Athens not to have a fleet, Aristides was certainly wrong; but it was not on account of his opinions that he had such credit, but on account of the nobleness of his character. He was a perfectly honourable man. Whoever else took bribes, or betrayed his cause (pp. 68, 74), it was known that Aristides would never be anything but true and just; and this, as we shall see, gave him real power, not only in Athens, but over all Greece, when the need for a just man was felt. At present such was the strife between the parties of Aristides and Themistokles that an ostrakism (p. 46) had to be held. Aristides was ostrakised, and Themistokles was left free to carry out his plans.

21. Xerxes invades Greece (B.C. 480).—King

Darius died in B.C. 485, and his successor, Xerxes, collected an enormous force for invading Greece. In every country from Asia Minor to the river Indus troops were levied. Two bridges of boats were made over the Hellespont. A fleet of 1,200 war-ships and 3,000 carrying ships assembled on the coast of Ionia and Phœnicia. Stores of food were collected in the towns along the coast of Thrace; and a canal was cut through the promontory of Mount Athos, that the fleet might not again have to make the dangerous passage round it (p. 58). The place of meeting for the land forces was Kritalla in Kappadokia. There, in B.C. 481, the troops of forty-six nations were assembled, perhaps a million in number, all dressed and armed in the manner of their native countries. Xerxes put himself at their head, and led them to Sardis for the winter. In the spring of B.C. 480 the whole host marched to the Hellespont, where the fleet was waiting for them. On the heights of Abŷdos a throne of white marble was erected; from this throne Xerxes looked over sea and land covered with his troops, and gave the order to cross into Europe. For seven days and nights his hosts were marching over the bridge. Then from the Hellespont the army marched along the coast of Thrace, and met the fleet again at Doriskus. Here the ships were drawn up on shore, and the crews and the land army were numbered together. From Doriskus the army and fleet passed on safely to the gulf of Therma.

22. Congress at Isthmus of Corinth.—In the autumn of B.C. 481, Sparta and Athens had summoned the Greek states to a Congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, to decide upon the best means of defending Greece. Deputies came from all the great Peloponnesian States except Argos and Achæa, and from Athens, Thespiæ, Plataea, and Thessaly. Ægina was reconciled to Athens, and joined the common cause. Argos, out of hatred to Sparta, and Thebes, out of hatred to Athens, favoured the Persians; Achæa had

never acted with Sparta. The Congress sent envoys to the colonies to ask them to join in the defence of Greece, but in vain. Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, who had a greater army than any Greek State, refused to help unless he were given the chief command: Crete would do nothing: Kerkyra promised to send ships, but did not mean that they should arrive in time. Thus it was but a small part of Greece that had the will and the courage to resist the Persians: and when we speak of the glory which Greece won by this war, we must remember that the greater part of Greece had no share in it whatever, but, on the contrary, did nothing for the cause of Greece. The credit of the war belongs to Athens, the Peloponnesian league, the little Boeotian towns of Plataea and Thespiæ, and a very few other States. Athens, though it contributed so large a fleet, honourably allowed Sparta to command both by land and sea, in order that there might be no division. The allies took an oath to resist to the last, and, if they should be successful, to make war upon all Greek States that had willingly submitted to Persia, and to dedicate a tenth of the whole spoil to the Delphic god.

23. **Tempē.**—The Congress had now to decide how Greece was to be defended. As the Persians had such an immense force, the best plan for the Greeks was, not to fight a pitched battle in the open country, where they would be surrounded, but to meet the Persians in some narrow place, where ten thousand men would be as good as half a million. Greece is so mountainous a country that sometimes the only way from one district to another is a single narrow pass; and the Congress believed that the Persians could only enter Greece through the narrow valley of Tempē in the north of Thessaly. They therefore sent an army of 10,000 men to Tempe. But on reaching it, the generals found that there was another road by which the Persians could get round them, so that it would be useless to post the troops at Tempe. They

returned to the isthmus of Corinth, and the Congress had to fix on another place.

24. *Thermopylæ*.—In all Thessaly there was no narrow pass which the Persians had to go through : but south of Thessaly, at the head of the Malian Gulf (map, p. 19), their road ran between the mountains and a swamp which stretched to the sea ; and at one place the swamp came so near the mountain that there was hardly room for the road to run between. This is the famous pass of *Thermopylæ*, and here it was thought a small army might block the way against any number of the enemy. The Spartans were just now celebrating a religious festival at which all their citizens had to appear ; therefore only 300 Spartans were sent to *Thermopylæ*, but with them were 1,000 Helots or more, and about 3,000 heavy-armed men from other Peloponnesian States. The general was Leonidas, king of Sparta. . On their way through Bœotia they were joined by the little army of Thespiæ, 700 in number, and a body of Phokians and Lokrians met them at *Thermopylæ* ; so that there were in all about 7,000 men. At the same time the fleet was posted at Artemisiûm, at the north end of the Eubœan Straits, to prevent the Persian fleet getting past and landing men behind the Greeks at *Thermopylæ*. The fleet numbered 271 ships, and was commanded by Eurybiades, a Spartan.

When Leonidas reached the pass of *Thermopylæ*, he found that there was a way over the mountains by which a body of Persians might cross and attack him from behind. He therefore sent the Phokians to defend the mountain-road, and made ready for battle himself in the pass. The Persians approached ; and for four days they lay before the pass without attacking, and were astonished to see the Spartans quietly practising gymnastics and combing their long hair as they did before a festival. On the fifth day, Xerxes ordered an assault, and during the whole of that day and the next the battle continued, without the

Persians being able to drive back the Greeks. But on the third day after the fighting began, a native of the country told Xerxes of the path over the mountain : and at nightfall a strong Persian force was sent to ascend the path and take the Greeks in the rear. In the early morning the Phokians heard a trampling through the woods. They were unprepared, and abandoned their post, and the Persians marched on to descend behind Leonidas. In the course of the night Leonidas knew what had happened. He saw that if he did not retreat immediately he must be surrounded and perish ; but the law of Sparta forbade the soldier to leave his post, and Leonidas had no fear of death. He ordered the other troops to retire while there was yet time, but himself, with his 300 Spartans, remained to die at his post. The other troops departed, but the 700 Thespians bravely resolved to stay and die with Leonidas. And now, before the Persians could descend behind him, Leonidas and his 1,000 men threw themselves upon the host in front. Leonidas soon fell, but his soldiers fought on until the Persians who had crossed the mountain were close at hand. Then, ceasing the attack, they took up their last position on some rising ground, to defend themselves against the enemy who now surrounded them. Here all died, fighting bravely to the last.

Thus Leonidas and his Spartans died at their post, and the Thespians died with them. Their heroic and voluntary death was not in vain. At a moment when the hearts even of the braver Greeks were wavering, and men were inclined to forsake the common cause in order to save themselves, Leonidas gave a splendid example of constancy and self-sacrifice, and showed the Greeks how a citizen ought to do his duty.

25. Fleet at Artemisium.—During the three days of the battle of Thermopylæ the Greek and Persian fleets were also engaged. The Greek fleet had been posted at Artemisium to prevent the Persian fleet entering the Straits of Eubœa, and landing troops

behind Leonidas ; but on its approach they were seized with a panic, and sailed down the straits to Chalkis, where the sea is very narrow. At Chalkis they heard that part of the Persian fleet had been destroyed by a storm, and they took courage and sailed back to Artemisium. Presently the Persian fleet came in sight, and its numbers so terrified the Greeks that they again prepared to forsake the post. Upon this the Eubœans, seeing that their only hope lay in the Persians being kept out of the straits, offered Themistokles thirty talents (7,000*l.*) if he could get the fleet to remain. By giving part of the money to Eurybiades and to other commanders, Themistokles persuaded them not to retreat. Thus at this great moment the chiefs of the fleet cared more for bribes than for duty, and were not ashamed to make money out of the danger of Greece.

The Persian admiral, when he saw the Greek fleet at Artemisium, sent off 200 of his ships to sail round Eubœa and inclose the Greeks from the south. When they had gone, the Greeks made a very skilful attack on the Persians and took thirty vessels. The same night a storm arose and entirely destroyed the 200 ships sailing round Eubœa. Next day fifty more Athenian ships joined the fleet, and the Greeks again attacked the Persians and gained some little advantage. On the third day the Persians did not wait to be attacked, but assailed the Greeks fiercely, and fought an even battle. On the morrow the Greeks heard of the destruction of the Spartans at Thermopylæ. Since the army of Xerxes had passed Thermopylæ, it was of no use for the fleet to remain at Artemisium ; they therefore retired southward down the straits, sailed round Cape Sunium, the end of Attica, and took up their position off the island of Salâmis (map, p. 62).

26. Athens abandoned and destroyed.—From Thermopylæ Xerxes marched upon Athens. The Spartans, instead of sending an army to defend Attica, kept the Peloponnesian forces at the Isthmus

of Corinth; for they cared little what became of Athens, so long as the Persians were kept out of Peloponnesus. Forsaken by their allies, the Athenians had no hope of being able to defend Athens, and resolved to abandon the town, and to remove their wives and children out of Attica to places of safety. The whole population, men, women, and children, sorrowfully left their homes, and streamed down to the sea-shore, carrying what they could with them. The fleet took them over to Salamis, Ægina, and Trœzène; and when Xerxes reached Athens, he found it silent and deserted. A few poor or desperate men alone had refused to depart, and had posted themselves behind a wooden fortification on the top of the Acropölis, the fortress and sanctuary of Athens. And now vengeance was taken for Sardis (p. 56). The Persians fired the fortifications, stormed the Acropolis, slaughtered its defenders, and burnt every holy place to the ground. Athens and its citadel were in the hands of the barbarians: its inhabitants were scattered, its holy places destroyed. One hope alone remained to the Athenians,—the ships which Themistokles had persuaded them to build.

27. Battle of Salamis.—As Xerxes advanced from Thermopylæ to Athens, his fleet had sailed along the coast, and was now anchoring off Athens, in the bay of Phalërum. (September, B.C. 480.) The Greek fleet lay a few miles off in the strait between Attica and Salamis (map, p. 62); more ships had joined it, raising the number to 366. Among the Greeks everything was in uncertainty. The Peloponnesian captains wished to retreat to the isthmus, in order to act with the land army. Eurybiades was undecided. Themistokles knew that if the fleet once left Salamis it would break up altogether, and was resolved, by whatever means, to have the battle fought where they were. He argued with Eurybiades and the Peloponnesian commanders; he made them hold council after council; he threatened to

deprive them of the 200 Athenian ships if they left Salamis ; and at last, when he saw all against him, he sent word secretly to Xerxes that the Greeks would escape if he did not attack them immediately. Early next morning, while it was still dark, the commanders were again assembled in council, when Themistokles was called out by a stranger. It was the exile Aristides, who, in the ruin and distress of Athens, had come to serve those who had banished him, and had made his way through the Persian fleet in the darkness to tell the Greek commanders that they were surrounded. Aristides was brought in to the council and declared it to be true. When day broke, the Greeks saw the enemy's ships facing them all along the narrow strait, and stretching far away on the right and left, cutting off all escape. Behind the Persian ships the Persian army was drawn up along the shore of Attica, and a throne was set in their midst, from which Xerxes surveyed the battle. The Persian fleet advanced, and the Greeks, seized with terror, pushed backwards towards the shore. But there was no possibility of retreat, and they presently gained heart and advanced. The fleets closed. Vessel crashed against vessel. In single encounters the ships and crews of Greece were seen overpowering their antagonists ; and when once the Greeks prevailed, the numbers of the Persian ships were their ruin. They were jammed together in the narrow space. Beaten and disabled ships prevented others from coming into action. Two hundred were destroyed under the eyes of Xerxes, and the rest, to escape ruin, fled out of the straits. By sunset the battle was over, and the Greeks prepared to renew the fight on the morrow.

28. Retreat of Xerxes.—But the heart of Xerxes sank. Though he had still 800 ships, he could bear the war no longer. He left 300,000 of his best troops in Greece with Mardonius, and himself, with the rest of the army, returned to Asia the way he had come. Fearing that the Greeks would break down the bridges

over the Hellespont, he sent his whole fleet to guard them till his arrival. On the march back through Thrace, thousands of his army perished of hunger and disease.

29. **Victory in Sicily.**—On the same day that the battle of Salamis was fought, another great victory was gained by men of Greek race against an invading army. Karthage (p. 35) had united with Persia to destroy Greece; and an immense Karthaginian army laid siege to Himera in the north of Sicily. Gelo, the tyrant of Syracuse, marched with 50,000 men to the relief of Himera, and dealt the Karthaginians such a blow that Greece was freed from all danger in that quarter.

30. **Battle of Plataea (B.C. 479).**—Mardonius and his army passed the winter quietly in Thessaly, for the northern Greeks were still obedient to the Persians. When summer came he marched into Attica. The Athenians had come back to their ruined homes after the battle of Salamis, and the city was partly rebuilt. They expected help from Sparta on the approach of Mardonius, but none came; and Athens was a second time abandoned and destroyed. At length the Spartans put forth all their strength. They summoned the land-forces of all the allies; and an army of 110,000 men marched against Mardonius, under Pausanias, the guardian of Leonidas' young son. (Sept. B.C. 479.) Mardonius had his head-quarters in Thebes, and the Thebans, out of hatred to Athens, served zealously in the Persian army. Pausanias marched into Boeotia, and for ten days the armies faced one another near Plataea. On the eleventh day the Greeks could get no more water. The braver captains were impatient for battle; but Pausanias dared not attack the Persians where they stood, and gave orders at nightfall to fall back on a better position. The movement threw the Greek army into disorder, and its three divisions were widely separated from one another. The next morning Mardonius, seeing that the Greeks had retreated, ordered an attack. The Spartans and Tegeans (p. 26) fronted the main body of the Persian

army; the Athenians were at some distance on their left; and the third division of the Greeks had retreated too far to take part in the battle. The Persians advanced to within bowshot, and, fixing their wooden shields like a palisade in front of them, poured flights of arrows upon the Spartans. It was the custom of the Spartans before beginning a battle to offer sacrifice, and to wait for an omen, or sign from heaven, in the offering. Even now, as the arrows fell, Pausanias offered sacrifice. The omens were bad, and he dared not advance. The Spartans knelt behind their shields, but the arrows pierced them, and the bravest men died sorrowfully, lamenting not for death but because they died without striking a blow for Sparta. In his distress Pausanias called on the goddess Hera: while he was still praying the Tegeans advanced, and instantly the omens changed. Then the Spartans threw themselves upon the enemy. The palisade went down, and the Asiatics, laying aside their bows, fought desperately with javelins and daggers. But they had no metal armour to defend them; and the Spartans, with their lances fixed and their shields touching one another, bore down everything before them. The Persians turned and fled to their fortified camp. The Spartans assaulted it, but they were unskilful in attacking fortifications, and the Persians kept them at bay till the Athenians came up victorious over the Thebans (p. 71). Then the camp was stormed, and the miserable crowds who had been driven into it were cut to pieces. No victory was ever more complete: the Persian army was totally destroyed, and the invasion at an end. Out of the immense spoil a tenth was given to the gods. The prize of valour was adjudged to the Platæans; they were charged with the duty of preserving the tombs of the slain; and Pausanias, by solemn oaths, declared their territory, in which the battle had been fought, to be sacred ground for ever.

31. Battle of Mykālē.—On the same day that the battle of Platæa destroyed the invaders of Greece,

a battle on the coast of Asia Minor put an end to the rule of Persia in Ionia. The Greek fleet had crossed to Asia, and met the Persian fleet at Mykālē, near Miletus. The Persian admiral would not fight by sea: he landed his crew, and hauled his ships ashore, and united with a Persian army on the land. The Greeks, who were mostly Athenians, were as ready to fight by land as by sea; they attacked the enemy on the beach, and not only gained a complete victory, but set fire to the Persian ships and destroyed them. The Ionians, who had been made to serve with the Persians, went over to the Greeks during the battle; and from that time Ionia was free.

32. **What saved Greece.**—Thus the Persians, who had conquered so great an empire, were completely beaten by a small part of Greece. We must allow that this was partly owing to the mistakes of the Persian commanders; and many things in the war did little credit to Greece. Many of the States submitted too easily to Xerxes; some were on his side from the first: even in those which fought the most resolutely there was generally a party ready to submit to Persia (p. 60). As a rule the Greeks thought too much about themselves and too little about the common cause. Sparta, though she dealt the death-blow at Plataea, had been slow and untrustworthy as the leader of Greece. But a State could hardly display greater courage, enterprise, and resolution, than Athens did from the beginning to the end of the war. It was the energy of Athens, and the habit of the Peloponnesian States to act in union under Sparta, that made European Greece so much harder to conquer than Ionia.

CHAPTER V.

THE EMPIRE OF ATHENS AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

1. **Walls round Athens and Piræus.**—After the battle of Plataea the inhabitants of Athens returned

to their ruined homes, and for the second time rebuilt the city (p. 71). Instead of rebuilding their old wall, however, Themistokles persuaded them to build one of much greater circuit, so that, in case of war, the country-people might bring their goods and take refuge within it. The neighbouring States, especially Ægina and Corinth, were jealous of the power of Athens; and when they saw the strong fortification Themistokles was making, they stirred up the Spartans to interfere and put a stop to it. But by a trick of Themistokles the Spartans were kept from doing anything until the wall had risen high enough to be defended. It was then too late for the Spartans to interfere, and they had to conceal their anger. The wall round Athens was finished, and a still stronger one was built round Piræus (p. 63).

2. **Pausanias.**—The battle of Mykale had freed Ionia, but many places on the coast of Asia Minor and Thrace were still held by the Persians. The chief of these was Byzantium, now Constantinople. So long as Byzantium belonged to the Persians, they could send out fleets from its harbour to injure Greek shipping, and could easily invade Europe again. The Greeks therefore laid siege to Byzantium, under the command of Pausanias. The city was taken, and some kinsmen of Xerxes fell into the hands of the Greeks. And now Pausanias formed a treacherous plan. In the conquered camp at Platæa and in Byzantium he had seen the splendour of Persian princes; and as he found out more about Persia, he saw how insignificant Sparta and all the Greek States were in wealth and size when compared with a great eastern kingdom. He grew discontented, and thought that he might make himself a great king like the kings of the east. Therefore, when Byzantium was taken, he released the kinsmen of Xerxes unharmed, and sent Xerxes a letter asking for his daughter in marriage, and offering to bring all Greece under the empire of Persia. He began to behave as if he were already a

Satrap, living in Persian luxury, and insulting the Greeks who served under him. A report of his treason reached Sparta, and he was summoned home. Upon this the Ionians serving in the fleet, who had been provoked by the insolence of Pausanias, invited the Athenian commanders to put themselves at the head of the Grecian navy in place of Sparta. The Athenians did so, and when the successor of Pausanias arrived from Sparta, he found that nobody would obey him, and returned home.

3. **Confederacy of Delos** (B.C. 477).—During the Persian invasion Sparta had been acknowledged as leader of Greece by all the States which fought (p. 65); but henceforward there were two great Leagues, one headed by Sparta, and one by Athens. The Peloponnesian States continued to follow Sparta; the islands and many towns on the coast of Asia Minor and Thrace joined the new League under Athens. This League was called the *Confederacy of Delos*, because its deputies met at the temple of Apollo in the island of Delos, and its treasure was kept there. The object of the League was to keep the Persians out of the Ægean Sea. Each city contributed yearly a certain number of war-ships with their crews, or a certain sum of money; and the man chosen to fix what each should contribute was the upright Aristides, who then commanded the Athenian fleet (p. 63). There were from the first two great differences between the Spartan and Athenian Leagues. The States in alliance with Sparta contributed land troops, those in alliance with Athens contributed ships; and again, Sparta encouraged oligarchical governments everywhere, Athens encouraged democratical governments. Thus in the same city the party of the nobles was often in favour of Sparta, the party of the common people in favour of Athens. The great mistake in the Confederacy of Delos was that some of the States were allowed to contribute money instead of ships and men. From this it came about that other States,

which had originally contributed ships, arranged to contribute money instead, in order to avoid the trouble and danger of naval service. This made them the subjects instead of the free allies of Athens. So long as they kept up their ships they had the means of defending themselves if Athens did them wrong; but when they sent money instead of ships, they lost all control over Athens, and the money became like a tribute to Athens instead of the common property of the League. In course of time the meetings of the deputies ceased; the treasure-house was removed from Delos to Athens (B.C. 459), and a great part of the money was spent in paying the Athenians for attending to public affairs, and in making Athens beautiful. This change came about gradually; at first the smaller States had no reason to complain of Athens. The war was continued against Persia; the places which Persia still held round the Ægæan Sea were conquered one after another; and in B.C. 466, Kimon, the Athenian general, gained a double victory over the Persians by land and by sea, at the mouth of the river Eurymædon, on the south coast of Asia Minor. The first signs of discontent with Athens appeared in this same year: Naxos (p. 58) revolted from the League, and was forced to join it again.

4. **Pausanias.**—Pausanias, when he reached Sparta (p. 75), was tried for treason, but not condemned. He returned to Asia Minor, and tried to persuade some of the States there to join him in his plans. The Spartans again made him return; and now he began to plot with the Helots for overthrowing the government of Sparta. At last the ephors (p. 23) contrived to overhear him speaking to one of his slaves, and what they heard convinced them of his treason. He took refuge in a temple, and was starved to death (B.C. 467).

5. **Themistokles.**—The ephors discovered that Themistokles was mixed up with the treason of Pausanias. With all his wonderful powers of mind, Themistokles had little feeling of honour. He had never

cared whether what he did was upright or not, so long as it gained his end ; and when the war was over he had used his great power to extort money for himself from the weaker States. His injustice and his boastfulness made him hated at Athens, and in B.C. 471 he was ostrakised, and went to live at Argos. When he found that his share in the treason of Pausanias was discovered, he fled, and made his way through many dangers to Susa, the capital of the Persian empire. Xerxes was just dead, and his son Artaxerxes was king. Themistokles wrote a letter to king Artaxerxes, saying that though he had done more than any man to injure Xerxes, he could do services to Persia that should be equally great. The king gladly received him, and gave him great wealth. It was expected that Themistokles, who never failed in what he undertook, would enable the Persians to conquer Greece : but he died without attempting it. He died an exile and a Persian hireling, because he had set money and power above justice and the love of country : but never was a little State made into a great one more truly by a single man than Athens by Themistokles.

6. Parties at Athens. — When the Athenians abandoned their country (p. 69), all able-bodied citizens, rich and poor alike, had served on board the fleet at Salamis. The share which the poor people had in winning that great victory made them consider that they had done as much for Athens as the rich, and that they ought not to be kept out of the offices of the State, as they were by the present constitution (pp. 41, 45). Aristides, the head of the party of the rich and noble, which tried to keep to old ways (p. 63), saw that the constitution would have to be changed, and proposed the change himself, in order to keep more hasty people from taking it into their hands. From this time the poorest citizen might be elected to the archonships or other offices, and Athens was more a democracy than before (p. 47). After the death of Aristides (B.C. 468), the leader of the party

of the nobles was Kimon, son of Miltiades, a good general and a very honest man. He and his followers were very friendly to Sparta, and wished that Athens and Sparta, with their leagues, should unite to carry on war against Persia, and do no harm to one another.

7. *Perikles*.—The leader of the opposite party was Perikles, a noble of the Alkmæonid clan. Perikles thought that everything in Athens had changed so much since the beginning of the Persian wars, that what was the right government some years back could not be the right government now. Athens was then a little quiet inland town. Its citizens were mostly small farmers, who only came into the city occasionally (p. 43), and might well leave State affairs to wealthier men, if they could keep their crops out of the hands of the usurer. Now, Athens was a great commercial city; a new town had sprung up on the sea (p. 63), thronged with enterprising, quick-witted traders; its merchant-ships were in every port of Greece; its navy had proved itself the strongest power in the world; it was at the head of a league that covered the Ægæan Sea. Athens had become a ruling city, and Perikles thought that its citizens ought to be a race capable of ruling both themselves and their empire. He thought that the commonest citizen might be made intelligent and sensible by education, by attending to the speeches made in the Assembly, by practice as a jurymen in trials, and by sharing in the daily life of his fellow-citizens, who had almost every kind of talent among them. He thought, too, that the great mass of citizens, if guided by wise statesmen, would form a better judgment on what was good for Athens than the small body of the nobles or the rich. He had no confidence that the nobles either wished to keep Athens in its new greatness or understood how to do so. Their love for past times seemed to him rather a drawback than an advantage, and their regard for Sparta dangerous to Athens. He saw clearly that Sparta would always be the jealous enemy of Athens; and though

he had no desire to hurry on a war, he knew that Kimon's attempt to keep on good terms with Sparta must fail, and he wished Athens to make itself as strong as possible before the conflict should break out.

8. Changes at Athens.—Kimon and his party had at first the upper hand. About B.C. 462 there was an earthquake in Sparta, and the Helots revolted. Sparta, in great danger, begged help of Athens, and Kimon persuaded the people to send him with a large force to help the Spartans. But after some time the Spartans suspected that the Athenian troops were playing them false, and sent them away. This insult exasperated the Athenians against Sparta. Kimon, the friend of Sparta, lost all his power, and the party of Perikles carried everything before them. They took from the Areopagus, in which the nobles were so powerful (p. 41), the right of forbidding new laws, and of interfering with the citizens; and they carried a measure giving regular pay to the citizens for attending the Assembly and for serving on juries, in order that poor men might be willing to give up their time to it, and the whole business of the State be more than ever conducted by the citizens themselves. The alliance with Sparta was broken off, and an alliance made with Argos, the enemy of Sparta. Kimon himself was ostrakised B.C. 459.

→ **9. Wars.**—The Athenians also made alliance with Megara, because in the mountains of Megara it would be easier for them to resist an army coming from Peloponnesus. Upon this Corinth and Ægina declared war with Athens. The Athenians gained a naval victory, and blockaded Ægina. At the same time the Athenians had a large army in Egypt fighting against the Persians; and the Corinthians, knowing that all the Athenian troops were occupied, invaded Megara (B.C. 458). The "boys and old men,"—that is, the citizens who were at home because they were too young or too old to be serving in the army,—marched out from Athens and completely defeated the

Corinthians. Part of an inscription still remains which gives the names of the Athenians who were killed in battle in this year. In this one year they were fighting in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phœnicia, in Megara, and off Ægina and the coast of Peloponnesus. It was their triumph over the Persians that filled the Athenian people with this wonderful spirit and enterprise. They felt as if nothing was too difficult for them.

10. *Bœotia*.—Most of the towns of Bœotia were united in a League of which Thebes was the head. Plataea had always struggled to get free from the League, and had at last succeeded, by allying itself with Athens (p. 59). This, together with other causes, made Thebes the bitterest enemy of Athens. The government of Thebes was oligarchical, and it could only maintain the League by establishing oligarchical governments in the other towns (p. 75). To assist the Thebans in doing this, a Spartan army was sent into Bœotia (B.C. 457), and the oligarchical party in Athens took the occasion to make a conspiracy with Sparta. The Spartan army was to surprise Athens on its march back from Bœotia, and to give the government to the nobles. But the Athenians discovered the conspiracy, and sent out an army to meet the Spartans. A battle was fought at Tanagra, and though the Athenians were beaten, the Spartans did not dare to enter Athens. Two months afterwards the Athenians marched into Bœotia, defeated the Thebans, and overthrew the oligarchies in all the Bœotian towns, establishing democracies in their place. These democracies were really like subjects of Athens, and in Phokis and Lokris the state of affairs was much the same ; so that the Athenians now in fact governed as far as Thermopylae. In B.C. 455 Ægina was taken, and made to pay tribute.

11. *Long Walls*.—Two great walls were now made, running the whole distance between Athens and Piræus,—a distance of more than four miles—about two hundred yards apart from one another

These walls immensely increased the power of Athens, for they made it impossible for any land army to surround Athens so as to deprive it of food. As long as these walls were not taken, there was a safe passage between Athens and Piræus ; and the Athenians, unless they lost their command of the sea, could bring food to Piræus in ships, from which it could be safely carried to Athens between the walls, even if an army surrounded Athens on the land side. In B.C. 452 a truce was made with Sparta for five years, and the power of Athens was now at its height. But in B.C. 447 the nobles of the Bœotian towns, who had been driven out by the Athenians, recovered their power, and defeated the Athenians at Coronæa. The Athenians lost all control over Bœotia, Phokis, and Lokris ; and at the same moment Eubœa and Megara revolted. The five years' truce was finished, and the Spartans invaded Attica. Athens was in great danger, but was saved by Perikles, who bribed the Spartan leaders to retreat, and subdued Eubœa. Peace was made with Sparta for thirty years (B.C. 445), Athens giving up all control over Bœotia and the other States on the mainland, so that its subjects and allies were now entirely maritime (p. 75). About the same time the war with Persia ended.

12. Athens under Perikles.—For the next ten years Perikles, holding the office of Strategus, directed everything at Athens. He did not place himself above the laws, like a tyrant, and make the people obey him by force ; but, remaining a simple citizen, he was able to rule the people through his eloquence and his wisdom, and above all through the perfect nobleness of his character. In making Athens treat her allies like subjects, and in giving the citizens pay for attending to public business, he was no doubt wrong ; and he was mistaken in thinking that the people might be trusted to follow a wise leader in preference to a foolish one. But no man ever devoted his life more high-mindedly, and with less thought of self,

to the service of his country ; and for this, and for the great wisdom and success of his management generally, and still more for the noble idea which he had of raising all Athenian citizens to intelligence and good taste, Perikles is often considered the finest of all Greek statesmen. One part of the work of Perikles will never be out of date. The best men in England and other free countries in our own day have the same feeling as Perikles had towards the people. Like Perikles, they wish to see the whole people, poor as well as rich, taking their fair share in the government, and interested in what goes on in the State ; and they believe that the happiness of a country will depend more than anything else upon the education and improvement of the people. The means by which Perikles tried to improve the people were not those which we are used to in England, such as schools and clubs for helping one another, but they were those which seemed most natural to a Greek. More than any man Perikles gave to the Athenians that love of knowledge, of poetry, and of art, which remained to them when their military greatness was gone, and which, more than its military greatness, has made Athens of service to mankind. He did not give the people book-learning, for little book-learning existed in those days ; but he tried to wake up all their faculties by making their daily life bright and active instead of dull and listless, and by giving as much interest and nobleness as possible to the things in which the whole people joined, such as the worship of the gods and the public amusements. Under his guidance, the temples and statues of the gods, which helped to give the Greeks their idea of the gods, were made grand, beautiful, and calm. Pictures were painted in public places of the actions of the gods on behalf of Athens, and of the greatest events in Athenian history. Plays, written by great poets, were performed at the cost of the State in a large open building before multitudes of people : the serious ones, called Tragedies,

represented some sorrowful story of the heroes ; the amusing ones, called Comedies, often had to do with present affairs. These plays not only gave the people pleasure, and helped to make them dislike coarse and stupid entertainments, but set them thinking, just as reading a book does now. The earliest great tragic poet was Æschylus, who fought at the battle of Marathon. His plays are very solemn ; there are very few characters, and they speak in a very stately way. The next, Sophocles, put more action into his plays, and made his characters act and speak more like real human beings. After him came Euripides, the most tender of all the tragic poets. The greatest comic poet, rather later than this, was Aristophanes, whose plays are still most amusing. He disliked the changes that had been made at Athens, and laughed at the new-fashioned statesmen. The study of nature was also beginning at Athens. It had been going on for some time in Ionia (p. 49), but Athens was fast becoming the meeting-place for all the cleverest men in Greece. The ordinary Athenians, however, thought it wicked to study nature, because they believed, for instance, that the sun was a god. An Ionian named Anaxagoras, the friend and teacher of Perikles, narrowly escaped being put to death because he said that the sun was made of stones, like the earth. Thus the search for knowledge was only now beginning in Athens, and the people were still superstitious ; but the poetry and the art of the time of Perikles have been a model of beauty to mankind ever since.

V13. Contrast of Athens and Sparta.—While Perikles was adorning Athens, Sparta remained like a plain village, without public buildings (p. 21) ; and the contrast in the life of the Spartans and of the Athenians was as great as the contrast in the appearance of the two cities. The life of the Athenians was full of variety : quickness and enterprise had become part of their nature. The Spartans, on the contrary, kept to their rough military life and their old-fashioned

rules. They had little education, and thought of little beyond making themselves steady soldiers.

14. Peloponnesian War.—In B.C. 431 the war broke out between Athens and the Peloponnesian League, which, after twenty-seven years, ended in the ruin of the Athenian empire. It began through a quarrel between Corinth and Kerkyra, in which Athens assisted Kerkyra. A congress was held at Sparta; Corinth and other States complained of the conduct of Athens, and war was decided on. The real cause of the war was that Sparta and its allies were jealous of the great power that Athens had gained. A far greater number of Greek States were engaged in this war than had ever been engaged in a single undertaking before. States that had taken no part in the Persian war were now fighting on one side or the other. Sparta was an oligarchy, and the friend of the nobles everywhere; Athens was a democracy, and the friend of the common people; so that the war was to some extent a struggle between these classes all over Greece, and often within the same city walls the nobles and the people attacked one another, the nobles being for Sparta, and the people for Athens.

15. Powers of Athens and Sparta.—On the side of Sparta, when the war began, there was all Peloponnesus except Argos and Achæa, and also the oligarchical Boeotian League under Thebes (p. 80), besides Phokis, Lokris, and other States west of them. They were very strong by land, but the Corinthians alone had a good fleet. Later on we shall see the powerful State of Syracuse (p. 35), with its navy, acting with Sparta. On the side of Athens there were almost all the Ægæan islands, and a great number of the Ægæan coast towns, as well as Kerkyra and certain States in the west of Greece. The Athenians had also made alliance with Sitalkes, the barbarian king of the interior of Thrace. Athens was far stronger by sea than Sparta, but had not such a strong land army. On the other hand it had a large treasure, and a

system of taxes, while the Spartan League had little or no money. In character the Athenians had the advantage, for they were ready for anything, and made the most of every chance, while the Spartans were slow, and would not change their ways. But Sparta had a great superiority in this, that its allies were acting with a good will, while many of the so-called allies of the Athenians were really not their allies at all, but their subjects : and in almost every city, though the common people were usually in favour of Athens, the nobles were eager to rise against her. The Spartans gave out that they made war in order to break down the tyranny of Athens and to restore freedom to all Greek States.

16. Plans of Perikles and of Sparta.—As Sparta was much stronger by land, and Athens by sea, Perikles advised the Athenians never to fight a battle by land, but, when the Spartans invaded Attica, to take refuge within Athens and to allow the Spartans to ravage the country. The long walls would enable the Athenians to import their food by sea, so that the destruction of the crops would be of little matter ; and they could do more harm to Sparta than Sparta could do to them, by making sudden descents by sea upon places in Peloponnesus. This was how Perikles wished to carry on the war ; and he advised the Athenians to be content with keeping their empire over the islands, and not to attempt great conquests on the mainland or in distant places. The Spartans, on the other hand, hoped to exhaust the Athenians by ravaging their country year after year, and to deprive them of the money which they received in tribute, by persuading their subjects to revolt.

17. Invasions of Attica. Plague.—In the summer of B.C. 431 the Spartans invaded Attica and destroyed the crops, but no battle was fought. The next year they again invaded it ; and when the people were crowded within the walls of Athens, a plague broke out, which killed great numbers. The strength

of Athens was only reduced for the moment ; but it is probable that the plague affected the whole future history of Athens by destroying many of the men who had been trained by Perikles, and who, at his death, would have kept the State in the wise course which Perikles had laid down for it. The Spartans invaded Attica again in three out of the next five years.

18. Death of Perikles.—Perikles died in B.C. 429. Some time before his death the Athenians had turned against him and unjustly condemned him to pay a fine ; but they repented, and Perikles was again set at the head of the State. After his death there was no man like him in Athens. *Demagogues* arose (*δημαγωγός*—*δημος*, *people*, *ἡγώγος*, *leader*), men who, without real knowledge, set themselves up as the leaders of the people and got on by making effective speeches. Perikles had often withstood the people, and told them fearlessly when they were wrong. The demagogues, on the other hand, depended on the favour of the people, and said what they thought the people would like to hear. The chief of them was Kleon, a tanner. The nobles, for their part, had clubs, through which they tried to keep the direction of the State in their own hands ; and the demagogues were like the natural leaders of the people against these clubs of the nobles.

19. Siege of Plataea (B.C. 429-427).—In the third year of the war, the Spartan king, Archidāmus, laid siege to Plataea with a large army, in spite of the oath taken by Pausanias (p. 72), because Plataea had always resisted the attempts of Thebes to govern the Boeotian towns, and allied itself with Athens for protection against Thebes. The garrison consisted of only 400 Plataeans and 80 Athenians ; but they made so good a defence that Archidamus gave up all hope of taking the town by storm, and built a double wall round it, in order to take it by famine. When the siege had been going on for more than a year, and provisions were running short, part of the garrison resolved to break their way out through the Spartans.

In the middle of a stormy winter's night they stole out of the town gate, carrying ladders with them, and came up to the Spartan wall unperceived. They set their ladders to the wall and mounted it surprised and killed the Spartan sentinels on the top of the wall, and escaped through the very midst of the Spartans, with the exception of a single man who was taken prisoner. This brave act enabled the rest of the garrison to hold out for some time longer; but at last their food came to an end, and they had to surrender. The Spartans put them all to death, in order to please the Thebans, and razed the town to the ground.

20. Phormio's Victories. — In the west of Greece both the Athenians and the Peloponnesians had allies. After the revolt of the Helots, in B.C. 462 (p. 79), the Athenians had settled a body of Messenian exiles, the bitterest enemies of Sparta, at Naupaktus, at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf; and the harbour of Naupaktus enabled an Athenian fleet to be kept in these waters. Further west, Akarnania was in alliance with Athens, Amprakia with Sparta. The Spartans planned an expedition against Akarnania both by land and sea. The land attack failed; and Phormio, the commander of the Athenian fleet at Naupaktus, gained two most striking victories over the Peloponnesians by sea. In the first battle Phormio, with twenty ships, beat the Peloponnesians with forty-seven; in the second the Peloponnesians had seventy-seven, and Phormio only twenty, as before. Phormio won the first battle by moving his ships about quickly: he was an excellent commander, and the Athenian crews were so well trained that they could do things of which the Peloponnesians had no idea. Accordingly in the second battle the Peloponnesians tried to drive Phormio close ashore, where his skill would be of no avail. Nine of his ships were thus cut off from the sea, and were beaten; but the other eleven escaped into the harbour of Naupaktus, and, turning suddenly round upon the victorious and

pursuing Peloponnesian fleet, beat its divisions one after the other, capturing six ships, and rescuing those of their own nine which had been captured in the first part of the battle (B.C. 429).

21. Revolt of Mytilēnē.—In B.C. 428 the island of Lesbos, with its chief place, Mytilēnē, revolted from Athens. The Athenians blockaded Mytilene by land and sea, and the Spartans were slow in sending help. Mytilene surrendered, and Kleon persuaded the Athenians to send an order that every grown-up man should be put to death. Next day the Athenians repented of their cruelty, and another order was sent off, which arrived just in time to save the Mytilenēans. Still the Athenians had a thousand of them killed.

22. Demosthēnēs.—The Messenians at Naupaktus persuaded Demosthēnēs, an Athenian general, to invade a territory of the Ætolians, their neighbours and enemies. Demosthenes, who was very bold and adventurous, hoped not only to conquer Ætolia, but to go on marching eastward, and reduce all the country along the north of the Corinthian Gulf between Naupaktus and Attica. But the land of the Ætolians proved too rugged for an army to cross, and Demosthenes had to turn back, after losing a considerable number of men. Soon, however, he made full amends for his error; for, when the Spartans and Amprakiots again attacked Akarnania by land, Demosthenes dealt the Amprakiots one of the most ruinous defeats known in Greek history, and forced the Spartans to give up the war in that district (B.C. 426).

23. Sphakteria.—Soon after this, Demosthenes seized and fortified the promontory of Pylus on the west coast of Messenia, in order to ravage the country and excite the Helots to revolt (B.C. 425). The Spartans in consequence laid siege to Pylus, and placed some of their troops on an island called Sphakteria, close to Pylus. But a large Athenian fleet came to the help of Demosthenes, and drove the Spartan ships

ashore, so that the troops on the island of Sphakteria had no means of getting off again, and were caught in a trap. Among them were many of the noblest Spartans, and there was no possibility of rescuing them from the island. So great was the dismay caused by this at Sparta, that the ephors tried to make peace with Athens: but the Athenians, persuaded by Kleon, asked unreasonable terms. Kleon was now made general himself, and had the glory of bringing the Spartans on the island prisoners to Athens, although the work was really done by Demosthenes. Their surrender greatly lowered the fame of Sparta, for it had hitherto been believed that Spartan soldiers would rather die than surrender. Soon afterwards the Athenians, under Nikias, conquered the island of Kythēra, off the south-east end of Peloponnesus. Possessing this, they could ravage the Spartan coast at their pleasure.

24. Massacres at Kerkyra.—The nobles of Kerkyra, which was a democracy, conspired to put down the democracy, and break off the alliance with Athens (p. 84). They killed the leaders of the people, and seized on the arsenal and the docks. But the people attacked and defeated them, and for seven days the city was given up to vengeance and bloodshed. Five hundred of the nobles, however, escaped, and fortified a hill outside the town. There they were blockaded by the people, whom the Athenians assisted, and they surrendered on condition of being sent to trial at Athens. Instead of this they were all murdered. This is the worst instance of the furious hatred which the war caused between the parties of the nobles and the people in the Greek cities.

25. Bœotia and Thrace. Brasidas.—The success of the Athenians at Sphakteria filled them with unreasonable pride; and they now thought of regaining the power on the mainland which they had possessed between B.C. 457 and B.C. 447 (p. 81), and which Perikles had advised them not to attempt to recover. They accordingly invaded Bœotia (B.C.

424), but were completely defeated in the battle of Delium. At the same time a Spartan general, named Brasidas, marched into Thrace and persuaded Amphipolis and other coast-towns to revolt from Athens. Brasidas was far more than an ordinary Spartan soldier. He had none of the usual Spartan slowness and fear of change. He was swift and daring; and not only this, but he had the power of making men trust and love him. Unlike most of the Spartans (p. 83), he was an eloquent speaker; and his words no less than his deeds excited the Thracian towns to rise against Athens. The loss of these towns, together with the defeat at Delium, turned the tide of war against the Athenians, which had hitherto been in their favour. Kleon was sent to recover Amphipolis. There he encountered Brasidas, and both Brasidas and Kleon were killed (B.C. 422).

26. **Peace of Nikias.**—Kleon had been the leader of the party most zealous for war, and his death made peace possible. Peace was made in B.C. 421, each side agreeing to give up their prisoners and the places they had taken in the war. The Athenians, however, were allowed by the Spartans to keep certain places which had surrendered to them and had not been taken by force. This conduct of Sparta gave such offence to the Corinthians and other States, from whom these places had been taken, that they refused to acknowledge the peace. On the other hand, the Athenians did not get back Amphipolis. The peace is named after Nikias, the Athenian general, who had the chief share in making it. The Spartans had gained nothing by the war, and the empire of Athens, except for the loss of Amphipolis, was as strong as ever.

27. **Alkibiades.** **Mantinêa.**—The head of the party who were opposed to peace, and wished to make new conquests, was now Alkibiades. Alkibiades was a young noble, very clever and daring, but bent only on making a great figure in the world. Owing to his cleverness and his good looks he had

been so spoilt and flattered that nothing could control him. If he liked to do a thing, he did it, without the least regard for the law. The impudence with which he told lies and deceived people in order to gain his ends almost passes belief. But his genius gave him great power over the Athenians, and the events now coming were due to his advice. Some of the Peloponnesian States, in their discontent with Sparta, were making a new League, with Argos at its head : Alkibiades persuaded the Athenians to join the League with Argos, and Athens now began to interfere with the affairs of the Peloponnesian States. The peace with Sparta was soon broken, and the Athenians joined the Argives in invading Arkadia. At Mantinēa the Spartan king Agis met them and defeated them in a great battle, which broke up the Argive League, and restored the power and fame of Sparta (B.C. 418).

28. **Melos.**—The island of Melos was now almost the only Ægæan island not subject to Athens. The Athenians, without any pretence of right, except that Melos was necessary to their empire, summoned it to submit to them ; and when the Melians refused, they conquered the island, put all the grown-up men to death, and sold the women and children as slaves (B.C. 418).

29. **Sicilian Expedition.**—The Athenians had for some time been interfering in the affairs of the Greek cities in Sicily (p. 35), and in B.C. 416, the city of Egesta applied to them for help against Syracuse. Alkibiades excited the Athenians with the hope of forming a new empire in Sicily, and Nikias in vain argued against such wild plans of conquest. It was determined to send an immense armament, and Nikias, Alkibiades and Lamachus, were appointed commanders. Since the death of Perikles, Nikias had been the citizen most esteemed in Athens. He was a noble, and very rich, but he served the people faithfully. More than any man he kept to the wise plans of Perikles for carrying on the war (pp. 85, 89), and resisted rash coun-

sels. He was just and pious ; but in the religion of that time there was much superstition, and the very piety of Nikias led, as we shall see, to a fearful result. Nikias had held many commands : he was a very brave man, and had hitherto been successful in war. But though he had done well in smaller enterprises, he was not fit for the immense command which was now given him. He was too cautious and hesitating, and let time pass idly by when not a moment ought to have been lost. The third general, Lamachus, was a good soldier, but he was so poor that nobody would listen to his advice.

30. Mutilation of the Hermæ.—In all the streets of Athens there were placed busts of the god *Hermes*, who protected the Athenian democracy. When the people rose one morning shortly before the expedition was to start, they found that all these busts had been disfigured in the night. Violent alarm seized upon the city, for the act was not only a daring insult to the gods, but a threat against the democracy. Among others, Alkibiades was accused of being concerned in it. He begged the people to settle his innocence or guilt before the expedition started ; but his enemies caused the inquiry to be put off, that they might make charges against him in his absence.

31. The Expedition.—In June B.C. 415, a fleet of 100 triremes sailed from Athens against Syracuse. At Kerkyra it was joined by the forces of the allies, and the whole armament mustered 134 triremes and 500 carrying ships, having on board over 5,000 heavy armed men, besides slingers and light-armed. Lamachus wished to attack Syracuse instantly, before it could prepare for defence : but instead of this the generals went about among the Sicilian towns seeking for allies. While they were thus engaged, Alkibiades was summoned home to answer a new charge of sacrilege. He fled to Sparta, and became the bitterest enemy of Athens. Nothing was done during the autumn, and Nikias kept his forces idle at (Sicilian)

Naxos during the winter. The Syracusans in the meantime fortified their town and sent to Greece for help. Remembering what Brasidas had done in Thrace, they begged the Spartans above all things to send them a Spartan general to take command. Alkibiades, who was now at Sparta, out of hatred to Athens persuaded the Spartans to do as the Syracusans asked.

32. **The Siege.**—Syracuse was the largest and most powerful city in Sicily. It lay on the coast, with high ground behind it. Since the delay of Nikias had enabled the Syracusans to make their fortifications, there was no hope of taking the town by assault, and the only chance of the Athenians was to starve it out by cutting off provisions by land and sea. They therefore, in the spring of B.C. 414, began to build a double wall round the town on the land side (p. 86), and made such progress with it that Syracuse was almost given up for lost. At the same time the Athenian fleet blockaded Syracuse by sea. But soon after this Lamachus was killed, and Nikias was left alone in command; and before the wall was quite finished a Spartan general named Gylippus arrived with about 3,000 mixed troops, and through the carelessness of Nikias was able to make his way into Syracuse. From this moment everything changed. Gylippus filled everybody with new hope. He defeated the Athenians on the high ground behind the town, and built a cross-wall in such a direction that unless the Athenians could take it they could never finish their own wall round Syracuse. The siege now stopped. The Athenian army had to keep to the part of the wall which they had built; their ships were rotting from want of repairs; the slaves who rowed the ships, and the citizens of subject States who served in the crews, were deserting; and the Syracusans, who had at first thought themselves hopelessly inferior to the Athenians by sea, were now manning ships in the harbour, and practising for a battle. Nikias wrote to Athens

for reinforcements, and asked to be allowed to give up the command (Sept. B.C. 414), for he was suffering from a painful disease. The Athenians foolishly insisted on his keeping it. In the spring of B.C. 413 Gylippus attacked the Athenians by sea. He was defeated in the first battle; but while the fleets were engaged in the harbour, the land army of Gylippus seized the naval camp and stores of the Athenians on the beach. In the second battle the Athenian fleet was completely defeated, and the Syracusans now looked forward to the entire destruction of the Athenians.

33 Demosthenes.—But hardly had the Syracusans won this victory, when they were dismayed to see a new Athenian fleet enter their harbour. The Athenians had made an immense effort, and had sent out seventy-five more triremes, with a new army, under command of Demosthenes, the most resolute and daring of all their soldiers. Demosthenes saw at once that unless the cross-wall of Gylippus were taken they could never surround Syracuse. Having failed in an attack upon it from the front, he led his troops a long way round by night, mounted the high ground without being perceived, and attacked Gylippus in the darkness. At first Demosthenes was victorious, but the darkness threw his troops into confusion. They slaughtered one another, and the battle ended in ruinous disaster.

34. Destruction of the Athenians.—His attack on the wall having failed, Demosthenes knew that Syracuse could not now be taken, and urged Nikias to retreat at once, before further evil befel them. Nikias for a long time refused; at length he agreed, and the order was given to sail the next day (Aug. 27, B.C. 413). But that night there was an eclipse of the moon, and Nikias, who deeply revered all supposed signs from heaven, was told by the soothsayers that the army must not move for a month (p. 51). The Syracusans had now discovered Nikias' intention

to retreat, and determined not to let the Athenians escape. They blockaded the great harbour in which the whole Athenian fleet lay, so that the Athenians could only escape by forcing their way through the enemy's ships. When every possible preparation had been made, the Athenian fleet advanced, and the battle began. The entire population of Syracuse crowded to the water's edge watching the battle, and on the opposite side of the harbour the Athenian troops which had not gone on shipboard were drawn up,—the whole multitude shouting and swaying their bodies in exultation, or agony, as they saw their friends conquering or conquered. It was a struggle for life or death. The Athenians fought with despairing bravery; but in vain. They were beaten and driven back upon the shore of the harbour. Their only possible chance now was to escape by land to some friendly city. Abandoning their wounded and dead, and in the depth of misery themselves, the entire host, numbering, it is said, 40,000 men, struck into the interior of the island. Perishing with hunger and thirst they were pursued and attacked by the Syracusans, and at the end of six days all who had not died or deserted were made prisoners. Nikias and Demosthenes took poison, in order to escape being displayed to the Syracusan populace. All the rest of the prisoners were made into slaves. Such was the fearful end of this great armament, the greatest that had ever yet been sent out by a Greek State.

35. Danger of Athens. Dekeleia.—The ruin of the Sicilian expedition was one of the greatest calamities that ever befel any nation. If the Spartans had acted with energy they might have crushed Athens at once, but they missed their opportunity, and the Athenians kept up the war with wonderful spirit. They were indeed hard pressed. The Spartan king Agis, by the advice of Alkibiades (p. 92), had seized a strong place, named Dekeleia, in the heart of Attica,

and kept a garrison there permanently, which ravaged the country in every direction, so that no crops could be grown. The cattle were destroyed, the slaves ran away to the Spartans, and the roads could not be used. Athens depended for food on supplies brought in ships, chiefly from Eubœa and from the coasts of the Black Sea.

36. Revolt of Chios—Alkibiades also persuaded the Spartans to build a fleet, and send it over to Asia to assist the Ionians in revolting. He himself crossed at once to Chios with a few ships, in order to begin the revolt. The government of Chios was in the hands of the nobles ; but they had hitherto served Athens so well that the Athenians had not altered the government to a democracy (p. 84). Now, however, they revolted (B.C. 413). This was a heavy blow to Athens, for Chios was the most powerful of the Ionian States, and others would be sure to follow its example. Miletus and Lesbos revolted in B.C. 412. The nobles of Samos prepared to revolt, but the people were in favour of Athens, and rose against the nobles, killing two hundred of them, and banishing four hundred more. Athens now made Samos its free and equal ally instead of its subject, and Samos became the head-quarters of the Athenian fleet and army.

37. Alliance between Sparta and Tissaphernes.—Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap of the centre of Asia Minor, wished to see the empire of Athens overthrown, because it kept Ionia free from Persia. He therefore made alliance with the Spartans, promising to pay the troops which they had sent over to Ionia ; and the Spartans basely agreed to give up to Persia all the Greek cities in Asia Minor. The Athenians, however, had now manned a fresh navy. They defeated the Peloponnesian and Persian fleets together at Miletus, and were only kept from besieging Miletus by the arrival of a fleet from Syracuse.

38 Alkibiades leaves the Spartans.—Alki-

biades had made enemies among the Spartans, and when he had been some time in Asia Minor an order came over from Sparta to put him to death. He escaped to Tissaphernes, and now made up his mind to win back the favour of Athens by breaking up the alliance between Tissaphernes and the Spartans. He contrived to make a quarrel between them about the rate of pay, and persuaded Tissaphernes that it would be the best thing for Persia to let the Spartans and Athenians wear one another out, without giving help to either. Tissaphernes therefore kept the Spartans idle for months, always pretending that he was on the point of bringing up his fleet to help them. Alkibiades now sent a lying message to the generals of the Athenian army at Samos that he could get Athens the help of Tissaphernes, if the Athenians would allow him to return from his exile: but he said that he could never return while there was a democracy; so that if they wished for the help of Persia, they must change the government to an oligarchy (B.C. 412).

39. **The Four Hundred.**—In the army at Samos there were many rich men willing to see an oligarchy established at Athens, and peace made with Sparta (p. 78). The rich had to contribute very heavily towards the expenses of the war; the sums spent in paying citizens for attending the assembly and jury courts (p. 79) exhausted the State; and the democracy had brought discredit on itself by its folly in deciding upon the Sicilian expedition against the advice of Nikias and other moderate men. Therefore, though the great mass of the army at Samos was democratical, a certain number of powerful men agreed to the plan of Alkibiades for changing the government. One of the conspirators, named Pisander, was sent to Athens to instruct the clubs of nobles and rich men (p. 86) to work secretly for this object. In these clubs the overthrow of the democracy was planned. Citizens known to be zealous for

the constitution were secretly murdered. Terror fell over the city, for no one except the conspirators knew who did, and who did not, belong to the plot ; and at last, partly by force, the assembly was brought to abolish the popular government and all the magistracies, and to give the State wholly into the hands of four hundred men of the party of the nobles. There was professedly to be an assembly of 5,000 citizens, but the Four Hundred did not mean to summon it. They now put to death many more of their enemies, and began to treat for peace with Sparta (B.C. 411).

40. **The Army at Samos.**—When the army at Samos heard of what had happened at Athens, they were furious against the conspirators, and took an oath to preserve the democracy. They declared themselves to be the true body of Athenian citizens, since those at home had abandoned the constitution ; and they met together with all the forms of the popular assembly, and elected the regular magistrates of the State. The democratic leaders of the army made friends with Alkibiades, who thereupon broke off his connection with the Four Hundred, and was made general of the army. Alkibiades had done the most deadly injury to his country. It was through him that Gylippus had been sent to Sparta, that Agis had occupied Dekeleia, and that Chios had revolted. But the soldiers were so convinced that he could get them the help of Tissaphernes, and make up for all the evil he had done to Athens, that they forgave him everything.

41. **The Four Hundred Overthrown.**—The Four Hundred were divided among themselves ; the more moderate were for summoning the 5,000 citizens, and allowing some kind of liberty ; the more desperate were determined to keep their power at any cost, and sent to the Spartans offering to admit them into Piræus. The Spartans missed their opportunity ; and the people could bear the government of the

Four Hundred no longer. The ancient constitution was restored, except that a man was required to have certain property to vote as a citizen, and that the payment for attending the assembly and the jury courts was abolished. A few of the leaders of the Four Hundred were put to death after a regular trial; but the people acted with great calmness and moderation, and there was no such violence as took place in Kerkyra and other states (B.C. 411).

At this moment Eubœa revolted and joined the Spartans. This was a desperate blow to Athens. No food could be grown in Attica, and now not only was it deprived of the food that came from Eubœa (p. 96), but the Spartans, by occupying Eubœa and its ports, could fall upon ships bringing food to Athens from other places.

42. Athenian Victories in the Hellespont. The Spartans, who at first fought only by land, had now grown used to the sea, and were prepared to fight out the war with the Athenian fleet off the coast of Asia Minor. When they found that Tissaphernes did not really mean to help them, they moved their fleet from Ionia to the Hellespont, to act with Pharnabāzus, the satrap of the northern part of Asia Minor, and to assist the towns in that district, which had already begun to revolt from Athens. Mindārus, the Spartan admiral, hoped to gain command of the Bosphorus and Hellespont, for then Athens would be cut off from the towns on the Black Sea, on which it now depended for corn. The Athenian fleet at Samos followed Mindarus northwards, and two battles were fought in the Hellespont, both of which were gained by the Athenians. In February B.C. 410, by the skill of Alkibiades, the Spartan fleet which was besieging Kyzikus in the Propontis was surrounded by the Athenians. Mindarus ran his ships aground and fought a land battle. The Spartans were completely defeated, Mindarus was killed, and their entire fleet lost. So great was the blow that

they sent proposals of peace to Athens, but the Athenians unwisely rejected them. Alkibiades continued to do Athens good service during the next two years, and the revolted towns about the Bosphorus were conquered.

43. Lysander and Cyrus. Ægospotāmi.—The king of Persia, seeing how Athens was recovering her power, and knowing that, if Athens came out of the war victoriously, the Persians could not recover Ionia, now determined really to help the Spartans, and sent his younger son, Cyrus, to the coast, to assist them with money. The new Spartan admiral, Lysander, was a most skilful leader and manager. He made such friendship with Cyrus, that Cyrus not only gave the Spartans the pay which he had promised, but increased it: and it was through this Persian money that Sparta at length overcame Athens. The war continued, however, and the Athenians gained more victories, till B.C. 405, when Lysander caught the Athenian fleet quite unprepared at Ægospotāmi in the Hellespont, and captured the whole of it.

44. Downfall of Athens.—Their fleet being gone, the Athenians had now nothing left but Athens itself. The towns in Asia Minor one after another surrendered to Lysander, except Samos; and in November B.C. 405 Lysander blockaded Piræus with his fleet, while the Spartan army, under Agis, surrounded Athens by land. The long walls were useless now, because Lysander was master of the sea, and no ships could approach Piræus with food. After four months the city was compelled by famine to surrender (March B.C. 404). The terms of peace were that Athens should give up her entire empire, and that the long walls and fortifications of Piræus should be destroyed. This was the end of the grandeur of Athens.

45. The Thirty Tyrants.—Lysander now helped the most violent among the nobles to overthrow the democracy, and set up a government of

thirty men. The chief of these was Kritias. The crimes of the Thirty are among the very worst recorded in Greek history. They put hundreds of the citizens to death without trial, and acted with such violence, wickedness, and cruelty, that they were always known afterwards as the "Thirty Tyrants." A garrison of Spartans was placed in Athens to protect them. But after eight months the citizens whom they had banished marched upon Athens. Regular battles were fought, and at last the Spartans ceased to protect the Thirty. The government of the people was restored in the spring of B.C. 403. However unwise the democracy had been (p. 97), it had never committed such crimes as the oligarchical governments of the Four Hundred and the Thirty.

46. **Unbelief. Socrates.**—The desperate struggles between the nobles and the people which were caused by the war in so many cities (pp. 84, 89, 96), made men disregard everything except the interests of the party to which they belonged. In their hatred against the opposite faction in the State, men lost their care for the State itself. The interest of the party was put in the place of law, custom, and piety. This, together with other causes, tended to break down the belief of educated Greeks in their old religion, and their old distinctions between right and wrong. The war spread violence all over Greece. Men acted as if mere force gave a right to everything (p. 91); and some even taught that this was so. In this bad time a man arose at Athens, named Socrates, who had such thoughts of truth and goodness as no Greek had ever had before him. He taught that it was better to suffer wrong than to do wrong; and that the gods wished men to honour them, not by beliefs and observances, but by doing good. His way of teaching was by asking questions, until he made people see how little they knew. The Athenians misunderstood him: he was accused of destroying men's belief in the gods,

and was put to death. While in prison he had the chance of escaping, but refused. The death of Socrates for the sake of the truth was a new thing in the history of Greece. Many men had died bravely for their country, but Socrates rather died like a missionary or a martyr. Both his life and his death made a deep impression upon those who had known him; and from this time there were men in Greece who gave up their lives to the search after truth.

CHAPTER VI.

SPARTA, THEBES, MACEDONIA.

1. Rule of Sparta.—Sparta had now control over all the places that had been subject to Athens. Lysander went through the cities, establishing in each an oligarchical government of ten citizens favourable to Sparta, and also a Spartan governor, called the *harmost* (ἄρμοστής, manager). The government of the Spartan harmosts was much more oppressive than that of the Athenians had been, and Sparta soon came to be hated by all the Greek States. The chief Spartans gained great wealth, and the character of the Spartan State changed (p. 22). There were now at Sparta a few very rich and powerful citizens, and the rest grew more and more poor and discontented.

2. Retreat of the Ten Thousand (B.C. 401).—Artaxerxes, the elder brother of that Cyrus who had helped Lysander (p. 100), had succeeded his father as king of Persia. Cyrus resolved to make himself king in his place, and hired an army of about 10,000 Greeks, with whom he marched into the interior of the empire. At Kynaxa, near Babylon, a battle was fought, and Cyrus was killed. The Greeks had now to make their way back to the coast from the very centre of the empire, through the enemy's country. Their return is called the "Retreat of the 10,000," and we have a history of it, written by Xenophon their leader. Their escape

showed how weak the Persian empire really was ; for, had it possessed an army good for anything, the little Greek force must have been destroyed in the course of its long retreat.

3. **Sparta at War with Persia.**—The Spartans were ashamed of having given up the Greeks in Asia to Persia, and now made war upon the Persian satraps in Asia Minor (B.C. 398). Their king Agesilāus gained some successes, and prepared to attack Persia with great force. Pharnabazus (p. 99) raised a Phœnician fleet, and gave the command of it to Konon, an Athenian admiral. Konon met the Spartan fleet off Knidus, near Rhodes, and completely defeated it (B.C. 394). The result of this was that Sparta lost control over the cities in Asia Minor, which depended on her having command of the sea. The Spartan harmosts were expelled ; and Konon, crossing over to Athens, rebuilt the long walls and the fortification of Piræus.

4. **Sparta at War with Greek States.**—The Persians also stirred up the Greek States to make war on Sparta. Thebes, which had been the bitterest enemy of Athens, now united with her against Sparta, and they were joined by Corinth and Argos. The Spartans had to call king Agesilāus and his army back from Asia, in order to defend them at home. War was carried on for some time in the territory of Corinth between Sparta and the States allied against her ; and at the same time the Athenians sent a fleet to the Hellespont, and were restoring their power by sea.

5. **Peace of Antalkidas** (B.C. 387).—The Spartans now found it necessary to make friends with Persia, and a disgraceful peace was made, called the peace of Antalkidas, by which the cities in Asia were given up to Persia, and the Persian king was allowed to command the Greeks to make peace with one another and to tell them what the terms of peace between them were to be, as if he were their master, and they

were his subjects. This was the result of the struggles of Athens and Sparta with one another, and of the help which both had received from Persia. All the Greek States agreed to this peace. The League of the Bœotian cities under Thebes was broken up, and in each of them an oligarchical government favourable to Sparta was set up. In some of them the Spartans placed garrisons of their own troops.

6. Sparta and Thebes.—There was a party in Thebes in favour of Sparta. When a Spartan army was passing through Bœotia, this party treacherously gave the citadel of Thebes, called Kadmeia, into their hands (B.C. 382), and a garrison of 1,500 Lacedæmonians was placed there. For three years the Spartans were masters of Thebes, but in B.C. 379 a plot was made against them by some Thebans, headed by a noble named Pelopidas. The commanders of the Spartan garrison were killed, and the Kadmeia was recovered by the Thebans. This greatly diminished the power of Sparta and encouraged her enemies.

7. New Athenian Confederacy.—The Athenians succeeded in establishing a league of seventy-four cities of the Ægæan Sea, resembling what the confederacy of Delos had been at first (p. 75). The cities were to keep their own governments, and a new name was given to the contribution which they were to pay, in order that the League might not seem like the empire of Athens restored. Thebes joined the League, and war was carried on against Sparta by land and sea. The object of the Thebans was to drive the Spartans out of those cities in Bœotia in which they still had garrisons, and to restore the Bœotian League with Thebes at its head. By B.C. 374 this object was accomplished; the governments favourable to Sparta were overthrown, the Spartan garrisons expelled, and the Bœotian League restored. Athens and Thebes now became jealous of each other, and in B.C. 371 Athens made peace with Sparta, leaving Thebes to carry on the war by herself.

8. Epaminondas. Leuktra. — The Spartans immediately invaded Bœotia, but the Theban infantry had become the best in Greece, and their commander, Epaminondas, was the greatest general of his time. Epaminondas met the Spartans at Leuktra, and so completely defeated them that all over Greece it was felt that the power of Sparta was at an end. But Epaminondas was not content with destroying the authority of Sparta outside Peloponnesus: in order to break down her power in Peloponnesus itself, and to surround her with enemies, he determined to unite Arkadia, which had hitherto been a number of disconnected cities, in one great League, and to make Messenia, which had been for 300 years subject to Sparta, an independent State. As the Arkadian cities were too jealous of one another to allow any one of them to be head of the league, Epaminondas founded a new city called Megalopölis (*the great city*, μεγάλη, πόλις), at which deputies from all the other Arkadian cities were to meet; and a city named Messēnē was built to be the centre of the new Messenian State (B.C. 369). Thus Epaminondas completely changed the condition of Greece. He brought down Sparta, which for hundreds of years had been the leader of a great part of Greece, to the level of an ordinary State, and made Thebes for the moment supreme. If we look at the actual changes which he produced, Epaminondas must be counted the greatest of all Greek statesmen, Themistokles alone excepted. But the work of Themistokles endured; that of Epaminondas passed away.

9. Mantinea. Death of Epaminondas. — Quarrels soon broke out in the new Arkadian League. A part of it, headed by Mantinēa, was in favour of Sparta, the rest in favour of Thebes. In B.C. 362 the Spartans sent an army into Arkadia; Epaminondas met them, and a battle was fought near Mantinea. The Thebans gained the victory, but Epaminondas was killed. It was Epaminondas who had raised Thebes

to its great power : there was no one like him left in Thebes, and after his death its authority quickly passed away.

10. *Macedon*.—The Greek States had exhausted their power in their wars with one another, and they were now about to fall under the dominion of Macedon, which had hitherto had no part in Greek history. The Macedonians were not acknowledged as Greeks. They were probably of mixed Greek and Illyrian race ; but this was not the reason why they were not ranked among the Greeks, for many of the colonies, which everyone called Greek, were of equally mixed race. The reason was that the Macedonians did not live like the Greeks. They lived mostly in the country, not in cities ; and while the great mark of a Greek was, that he belonged to a little State in which the citizens met together and managed the affairs of their State themselves, the Macedonians, on the contrary, formed one country subject to a king. They had no books and no art, but passed their time in farming and hunting, and a rough country life ; so that not only was the government of the Greeks and the Macedonians quite different, but to an educated Greek citizen the ordinary Macedonian would seem too uncouth to be a Greek. The kings of Macedon, however, were admitted to be Greeks, and were allowed to take part in the Olympian games (p. 24). They had long been trying to make themselves and their court as much like the Greeks as they could. Archeläus, who was king about B.C. 400, had invited Greek poets and artists to Macedonia, and had also built cities and made roads, in order that his people might become more peaceable and prosperous. Thus, when the Greek States were worn out by their wars, Macedonia was just beginning to be a powerful country. The people were hardy, brave, and obedient ; and it happened that, when the death of Epaminondas left Thebes without a leader, Macedonia was governed by a king, Philip, who was superior to any Greek of

his day. Philip had been three years a hostage at Thebes in his youth, and had learnt from Epaminondas both how to make the best possible army, and how most to strengthen his own country and weaken his enemies. He established a regular army, such as no Greek State possessed (p. 15), and set himself to extend his dominions, and become the head and leader of Greece.

11. Olynthus. — Between the eastern part of Philip's dominions and the sea lay the district called Chalkidikē, in which were a number of Greek cities. One of these, named Olynthus, had become a very powerful State, and had placed itself at the head of a League of the neighbouring cities, called the Olynthian Confederacy. Further east was the important city of Amphipolis, which Athens had lost in the Peloponnesian war (p. 90), and had never been able to recover. Other places on this coast still belonged to Athens, so that Athens was concerned from the first in the action of Philip. Philip made friends with the Athenians on the pretence that he would gain Amphipolis for them: but when he had conquered it, he kept it himself; and then, in order to prevent the Athenians and Olynthians joining together against him, he gave up another city to Olynthus, so that the Olynthians became his allies (B.C. 357). He now crossed the river Strymon and conquered the western part of Thrace, in which there were very rich gold mines, and founded there the city of Philippi (Acts xvi. 12).

12. Sacred War.—Philip soon found an opportunity of interfering in the affairs of Greece proper, through a war connected with the temple of Delphi. Thebes, after the battle of Leuktra, had gained control over Phokis, but the Phokians were a spirited race, and threw off her dominion. The Thebans now brought the Council of Amphiktyons (p. 18) to take part against the Phokians, and to condemn them to a heavy fine for having cultivated the plain of Krisa

(p. 28). On this the Phokians seized the temple of Delphi itself (B.C. 355); and by means of its treasures they were able to raise a large army, with which they carried on war against the Thebans and Lokrians. Athens and Sparta joined the Phokians, who were also supported by some of the tyrants reigning in Thessaly. The Thessalian nobles, on the other hand, applied to Philip for help. A great battle was fought in Thessaly between Philip and the Phokians; Philip gained the victory, and made himself master of all Thessaly (B.C. 352). He intended to march into Phokis, but when he reached Thermopylæ he found a strong Athenian force there, and turned back.

13. *Demosthenes*.—The Athenians had again placed themselves at the head of an Ægæan League (p. 104), and, if they had acted with spirit and wisdom, they might have checked Philip. But they had lost their old energy, and now cared more for shows and amusements than for anything else. The rich grudged giving anything to the State, and tried to escape from the taxes; and the Athenians generally, whose forefathers had been ready to go anywhere and do anything for the good of Athens (p. 80), had now such a cowardly dislike to military service that it was necessary to employ hired soldiers, who were not Athenians at all. In B.C. 358 a war broke out between Athens and its allies. Athens was unsuccessful, and the larger cities again became independent, while only the smaller ones remained in the League. But there was one man in Athens worthy of its best days,—Demosthenes, the orator. Demosthenes saw that Philip meant to make himself master of Greece; and, while many of the Athenians were for keeping on friendly terms with Macedon, Demosthenes was convinced that unless Philip were checked the liberty of Athens would be lost for ever. He strove to awaken the Athenians to their danger, and to stir up in them the spirit of their forefathers; to make them act at once and with resolution, instead of letting things

take their course. The power of Demosthenes was his eloquence: he was the finest speaker that there has ever been. It was on the conquest of Thessaly by Philip that Demosthenes made his first great speech against Philip, called the *First Philippic* (B.C. 352).

14. **Philip conquers Olynthus.** — Thessaly being conquered, the Olynthians saw that Philip would attack them next, and sent to Athens proposing an alliance. Demosthenes urged the Athenians to join Olynthus: an alliance was made, and the war began. But the Athenians gave so little help that Philip took the towns of the Olynthian League one after another, and last of all Olynthus itself fell (B.C. 348). Philip is said to have completely destroyed thirty cities, and to have sold all the Olynthians who fell into his hands as slaves. The whole of Chalkidike was thus added to Philip's dominions.

15. **Philip ends the Sacred War.** — The Sacred War was still going on. Philip contrived to make a treaty of peace with all the Greek States except the Phokians; and when he had thus cut the Phokians off from all help, he marched into Phokis and conquered the entire country, inflicting such misery and ruin as the Greeks had never seen. He occupied Delphi, gave the temple back to its managers, and summoned the Amphiktyonic Council. The Council decreed that every Phokian town should be destroyed, and the Phokians should live in villages only. The votes which the Phokians had had in the Council were transferred to Philip, and he was given the right of presiding at the Pythian games which were held at Delphi. By this means Philip made himself recognised by the Amphiktyonic Council as the champion of the god Apollo (comp. p. 25), and gained the right of interfering in Greek affairs whenever he could make out that any wrong had been done to the god and his temple (B.C. 346).

16. *Peloponnesus*.—In most of the Peloponnesian States there were parties at enmity with one another. Philip skilfully turned this to his own account, and gained over one of the parties wherever he could. He made friends especially with the States which Epaminondas had founded (p. 105), for these were afraid of Sparta and anxious for foreign protection. To counteract the schemes of Philip, Demosthenes himself went at the head of an embassy to the Peloponnesian States which had joined Philip, and tried to make them understand that they had joined the enemy of all Greece. Nothing resulted from this journey; but the warning of Demosthenes had now been clearly set before the Greeks. "Philip," he said, "is the enemy of all the Greeks alike. He is a king; and if victorious, he will make the Greeks his subjects. Let the Greeks cease their quarrels with one another, and unite to preserve the liberty which is the birthright of the Greeks against the despot who seeks to enslave them all." Thus Demosthenes struggled not for Athens alone, but for the whole Greek race.

17. *Athens and Byzantium*.—At first the Athenians had paid little regard to Demosthenes; but as time went on, and all that he had said about Philip's ambition was seen to be true, a strong party gathered round him, and Athens at last began to act with vigour. After finishing the Sacred War, Philip went on conquering eastwards in Thrace. He was as yet at peace with Athens, but an Athenian commander on the Thracian coast came into conflict with the Macedonian troops. Philip wrote a letter to Athens complaining of this, and proposing a closer friendship. Demosthenes stirred up the Athenians to reject Philip's offer, and to ally themselves with Byzantium, which Philip was now attacking. Help was sent from Athens to Byzantium; it was effectual, and Philip had to give up the siege (B.C. 341). This success increased the power of Demosthenes at Athens, and enabled him to

carry laws diminishing the useless expenditure of the public money on festivals (p. 108), and creating a fund for carrying on the war. He also took measures for making the rich pay their fair share towards the fleet, on the strength of which, more than anything else, the success of Athens against Philip depended.

18. **Chæronēa.**—But Philip had friends and hirelings in abundance in Athens and in every other Greek State. The chief of these in Athens was Æschinēs, who, as an orator, was superior to everyone except Demosthenes, but, as a citizen, ranks among the worst men that Athens ever produced. Æschines was the deputy of Athens at the Amphiktyonic Council; and there, in B.C. 338, he caused war to be declared by the Council against the neighbouring town of Amphissa on some trifling matter, in order that Philip might be summoned to take command (p. 109). Philip moved southward with a large army. Suddenly the news reached Athens that, instead of marching on Amphissa, Philip had seized Elateia in the east of Phokis, a place that commands the entrance to Bœotia and Attica. Amphissa had been a mere pretence; and the seizure of Elateia meant that Philip might at any moment be at the gates of Athens. The Assembly was summoned; and when every one else was silent through fear and dismay, Demosthenes called upon the Athenians to ally themselves with Thebes, and meet Philip boldly. They did so; and on August 7th, B.C. 338, the Athenian and Theban armies encountered Philip at Chæronēa in Bœotia. They were utterly overthrown, and Philip was master of Greece.

19. **Death of Philip.**—Philip now summoned a congress of all the Greek States at Corinth. War was declared against Persia, and Philip was appointed commander of the entire force of Greece. He returned to Macedonia to prepare for the invasion of Asia. But in the very height of his glory, as he was

celebrating the marriage festival of his daughter with the king of Epirus, he was murdered by a Macedonian noble, and his crown passed to his son Alexander (B.C. 336).

CHAPTER VII.

EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER.

1. **Alexander Master of Greece.**—Alexander, on coming to the throne, found everything ready for the invasion of Persia. As the death of Philip caused a movement in favour of liberty in some of the Greek States, Alexander instantly marched into Peloponnesus with a large army, in order to show the Greeks how strong he was. A congress was held as before at Corinth, and Alexander, though only twenty years old, was recognized as the head and the general of Greece. He then returned to Macedonia, and in the spring of B.C. 335 made an expedition against the barbarous nations north of Macedonia. He first fought his way through Thrace to the Danube, which he crossed, defeating the Getæ who lived beyond it, and then turned south-west, and defeated the Illyrians on the west of Macedonia. While he was absent, a false report of his death reached Greece, and the Thebans revolted and besieged the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. Alexander marched from Illyria with wonderful quickness, and captured Thebes. The city was razed to the ground, and the entire population sold as slaves. This complete destruction of the State which had lately been at the head of Greece struck terror into the other cities, and put an end to all thoughts of resistance.

2. **The Macedonian Army. Phalanx.**—The army which Philip had prepared, and with which Alexander overthrew the Persian empire, was so armed and arranged that, though it was not very numerous, it was the strongest force there had yet been in the world. The great feature of the Macedonian

army was the *phalanx*. This was a body of foot soldiers armed with spears twenty-one feet long, and drawn up in sixteen ranks, each rank standing three feet behind the one in front of it, and holding their spears fifteen feet from the point and six feet from the heavy end, so that the spears of all the first five ranks would project in front of the men in the first rank, to the distance of three, six, nine, twelve, and fifteen feet respectively. The ordinary Greek spear projected only six feet ; so that when the Thebans charged the Macedonian phalanx at Chæronea, they had to break through three rows of spear-points before their own could strike the Macedonians. The fault of the phalanx was that it could not turn round quickly, and that it required even ground to keep its order ; and thus, though the phalanx was a stronger body of heavy armed troops than any that there had hitherto been in Greece, the Roman method of first throwing a short spear and then fighting with swords proved to be superior even to the phalanx, for in this there was nothing to prevent the soldiers being rapidly moved about in every direction, and each man could fight for himself and use his sword just as well on rough ground as smooth. There is, however, no instance of the phalanx being beaten on good ground by troops with a shorter weapon attacking it in front. The Romans, when they met the phalanx, gained the victory by attacking it on the sides, and on hilly ground, where its spears could not be kept in their proper order. Alexander never used the phalanx by itself, but began his battles with other troops, and then brought up the phalanx to make the decisive charge and end the battle.

3. **Guard and Cavalry.**—The soldiers in the phalanx were all native Macedonians : native Macedonians also served in the *guard*—a body of infantry armed with the ordinary Greek spear and shield—and in two divisions of cavalry, one division wearing heavy armour and carrying a short thick spear for

fighting in regular battles, the other without much armour, and carrying a long light lance for scouring the country and pursuing the enemy. The king was attended by a band of young Macedonian nobles, called the *pages*. From this the young nobles were promoted into a picked troop called the *body-guard*, or, as we should say, the *staff* of the king, out of which the king chose his generals and greatest officers.

4. **Other troops.**—Besides these divisions of the army, composed of native Macedonians, there were regiments of Greeks, both infantry and cavalry, and also regiments drawn from the barbarian countries about Macedonia, armed with bows, javelins, or other light arms. Above all there was a regular division of the army to work machines for hurling stones, both in sieges and in battles. These machines did, in an inferior manner, the work that cannon do now. In Greek warfare they had hitherto been employed only to batter walls in sieges. Alexander first used them with effect in battles, and later on in history there is an instance of a battle being decided by this kind of *artillery*.

5. **Military Monarchy.**—Thus the Macedonian army, though not numbering above 40,000 men, comprised troops and appliances for every kind of service. In its spirit it was as unlike the army of a Greek State as possible. In a Greek army the soldiers were the citizens themselves (pp. 15, 41), who, as soon as the war was over, returned to their ordinary life; and the generals were citizens too, and were elected by the people. But in the Macedonian army the king was everything. The soldiers had never known what it was to act as citizens; they knew little about laws or liberty, but were devoted to their king, who led them and fought in the midst of them. The generals had begun by being the king's pages; then they had accompanied him in his body-guard, and had been promoted because they had gained his friendship or

good opinion. Liberty is out of the question in a State where the army is thus the instrument of a single man, like Alexander, Cæsar, or Napoleon : but the army itself, supposing the monarch to be a good general, becomes exceedingly effective, both because the love of soldiers for their general is one of the strongest feelings that men can have, and makes them do wonders of bravery and endurance, and also because an army is always far better directed when a single good commander is supreme than when a number of generals succeed one another in the command, or the government of the State has the right to interfere with the action of the general. It happened that Alexander, who had now absolute command of the army which Philip had brought to such perfection, was a man of extraordinary genius for war. From all these causes the Macedonian army, with Alexander at its head, was such a force as there had never yet been in history, and could probably without much difficulty have conquered the entire world.

6. Character of Alexander.—Alexander deserves his name of *the Great* for his wonderful qualities as a general and for his natural power over men. No human being ever showed such energy in war. While he never spared himself, his marches sometimes killed with fatigue the men and horses who accompanied him. Whatever there was to do, he did it with the utmost swiftness : generals and soldiers felt that they were commanded by a man whom nothing could resist. It is true that his adversaries were chiefly Asiatics, so that the victories which he won in pitched battles would not by themselves prove Alexander to have been a great general : but the readiness in which his troops were always found, the astonishingly long and swift marches which he made them perform, the certainty with which he carried out everything that he attempted, and the confidence which his soldiers felt in him, prove him to have been an extraordinary leader. Roman generals capable of forming

a good judgment considered Alexander to have been the greatest of all commanders except Hannibal the Karthaginian. In bravery, determination, and high spirit, no man ever surpassed him. But when we look beyond the qualities of the soldier, and compare Alexander with Perikles or other of the really noblest Greeks, he is often not great at all, but contemptible. If he had only slaughtered his prisoners, that would not have been a stain on his character, for it was a common practice at the time : but Alexander dragged alive behind his chariot a general who had gallantly opposed him ; he tortured and put to death on mere suspicion Philōtas, the commander of his cavalry, whose friend he had pretended to be up to the last moment ; he killed by craft Parmenio, one of his oldest generals, the father of Philotas, on the same suspicion ; he took advantage of being a king to murder Klitus, one of his oldest friends, in savage drunkenness ; he tortured and hanged Kallisthēnes, a Greek writer, on suspicion of a conspiracy, but in part because Kallisthenes had refused to worship him as a god. Alexander is sometimes spoken of as the hero of Greece, but the truth is that there was very little of the Greek in him at all, and much more of the half-barbarian king. In the last years of his life conquest and glory brought out the savage and wilful parts of his nature (p. 30) ; and if he is to be treated as a Greek, some of his acts can only be compared to those of the very worst tyrants. He was the complete opposite of men like Perikles or Epaminondas, who, as their power increased, kept the stricter watch over themselves, and were the more anxious to respect the rights of others.

7. Conquest of Asia Minor.—In B.C. 334 Alexander crossed the Hellespont. The best troops which the Persians had to oppose to him were regiments of hired Greeks, and the commander of these, Memnon, a Rhodian, understood war well. Memnon advised the Persian satraps not to fight a pitched battle

with Alexander, but to defend the mountain passes and the towns, and to send the Phœnician fleet, which was superior to Alexander's, to excite the Greeks against Macedonia and attack Macedonia itself. The satraps, however, would not listen to Memnon, but fought a battle near the Hellespont on the river Granikus, which Alexander won after very hard fighting. Darius, king of Persia, now gave the commandership to Memnon. Memnon prepared to act by sea, and gained over several of the Ægæan islands; but soon after this he fell ill and died. Alexander overran Asia Minor, and Darius, giving up the plans of Memnon, collected an enormous army to fight a pitched battle. The battle was fought near Issus, on the borders of Kilikia and Syria (first map). Darius fled with shameful cowardice; and though the native Persians fought bravely, Alexander gained a complete victory, and the family of Darius fell into his hands (B.C. 333).

8. **Conquest of Phœnicia.**—Darius retreated across the Euphrates, but instead of pursuing him Alexander turned south into Phœnicia. Damascus was taken, and the Phœnician seaports, except Tyre, surrendered without a blow. This caused the Phœnician fleet employed by the Persians to break up, and the best chance of the Persians against Alexander was now gone. Tyre alone refused to admit Alexander. The city of Tyre was built on an island half a mile from the mainland, and was surrounded by an immensely strong wall (Ezekiel xxvii. 3, 11). The Tyrians had ships, and Alexander had none, so that in their island city it seemed as if they might safely defy him. But Alexander determined to reach Tyre on dry ground, by building a solid stone pier 200 feet broad across the half mile of sea, and thus connecting Tyre with the land. The pier was built, but when it came near the city walls the Tyrians again and again destroyed it. At last Alexander had to bring up the fleet of the other Phœnician cities to protect the

builders. The pier was finished; Alexander's siege engines were rolled along it, and a breach was at length made in the city wall. After a most furious struggle Tyre was taken by assault. The siege lasted seven months; both the attack made by Alexander and the defence made by the Tyrians are among the most famous in history (B.C. 332).

9. **Egypt. Alexandria.**—From Phœnicia Alexander passed into Egypt, which made no resistance. The Persians had provoked the Egyptians by insulting their animal gods (p. 52): Alexander on the contrary, offered sacrifices to them, in order that the Egyptians and other nations might see that he meant to respect their religion, and might welcome his government in place of the Persian. He now founded the city of Alexandria at the mouth of the Nile. Alexandria afterwards became the most important city in the world, except Rome, but Alexander cannot have foreseen this. His object in founding it was probably to connect Egypt with the rest of his empire by creating as its capital a trading town on the coast, with a population of mixed Greeks and Egyptians.

10. **Arbēla. Marches of Alexander.**—After visiting the temple of Ammon in the desert west of Egypt, Alexander marched through Syria to the north-east, and having crossed the Euphrates and Tigris, encountered Darius and a vast army near Arbēla, not very far from Nineveh. Darius again fled from the battle at the first sight of danger, and Alexander won a complete victory (B.C. 331). He now acted as master of the Persian empire, and appointed the satraps. He entered Babylon with great pomp, and pleased the priests and people by sacrificing to their gods, and by ordering the temples which the Persians had destroyed to be rebuilt. Having given his troops a month's rest, he marched to Susa, and from thence to Persepölis (south-east), the capital of the native district of the Persians. Immense treasure was found

here and though no resistance was made, Alexander burnt the town and let the soldiers massacre part of the inhabitants, merely to avenge the invasion of Greece, 150 years before, upon the native capital of the Persians (B.C. 330).

11. Death of Darius.—Darius had fled from Arbēla to Ekbatāna in Media, and Alexander now set out in pursuit of him. As Alexander approached, Darius escaped eastwards through the mountains at the south end of the Caspian Sea. Alexander pursued day and night; but, when he came in sight, Darius was murdered by Bessus, one of his own nobles, that he might not give himself up to Alexander.

12. Alexander beyond the Caspian.—After reducing the country at the south of the Caspian, Alexander marched east and south, through what is now Persia and Afghanistan. On his way he founded the colony of Alexandria Arīon, now Herat, an important military position on the western border of Afghanistan. At Prophthasia (Furrah), a little further south, he stayed two months, and it was here that Philotas was put to death (B.C. 330). Thence he went on eastwards and founded a city, said to be the modern Candahar, and then turned north and crossed the Hindo Koosh mountains, founding another colony near what is now Cabul. Bessus had intended to resist Alexander in Bactria (Balkh), but he fled northwards, and was taken and put to death. Alexander kept on marching northwards, and took Marakanda, now Samarcand, the capital of Bokhara (B.C. 329). He crossed the river Jaxartes (Sir), running into the sea of Aral, and defeated the Scythians beyond it, but did not penetrate their country. He intended the Jaxartes to be the northern frontier of his empire, and founded on it the colony of Alexandria Eschātē (ἑσχατή, *the furthest*). The conquest of Sogdiana (Bokhara) gave Alexander some trouble, and occupied him till the year B.C. 327.

13. Alexander in India.—In B.C. 337 Alexander set out from Bactria to conquer India. He reached the upper Indus, and having crossed it near Attock, marched on eastwards through the Punjaub. Beyond the Hydaspes (Jelum), Porus, king of the country, met Alexander and fought a battle; he was defeated, but Alexander allowed him to keep his kingdom as his vassal. Going on eastward he came to the Hyphasis (Sutlej or Gurrah): and now the soldiers refused to go any further in spite of Alexander's entreaties. Alexander therefore turned back, but when he reached the Hydaspes, he put part of the army on board boats, and ordered the rest to march along the bank down the river. The Hydaspes flows into the Akesines (Chenab), and that into the Indus, At the junction of the Akesines and Indus a town and docks were laid out, and the army and fleet went down the Indus till they reached its mouth, and saw the Indian Ocean (B.C. 325). Thus 2,000 years ago Alexander explored the course of that river along which English engineers are now (A.D. 1875) laying down a railway.

14. Voyage of Nearchus.—Alexander was as eager for discovery as for conquest; and from the mouth of the Indus he sent his fleet, under the admiral Nearchus, to make their way along the coast to the mouth of the Euphrates. He himself marched westwards with the army through the deserts of Beloochistan, and brought them after terrible sufferings, through thirst, disease, and fatigue, again to Persepolis (B.C. 324). From this he went to Susa, where he stayed some months, investigating the conduct of his satraps, and punishing some of them severely.

15 Asiatic habits of Alexander.—Since the battle of Arbela, Alexander had become more and more like a Persian king in his way of living, although he did not allow it to interfere with his activity. He dressed in the Persian manner, and took up the ceremonies of the Persian court. The soldiers were

displeased at his giving up the habits of Macedonia, and at Susa he provoked them still more by making eighty of his chief officers marry Persian wives. The object of Alexander was to break down distinctions of race and country in his empire, and to abolish the great gulf that there had hitherto been between the Greeks and the Asiatics. He also enrolled many Persians in the regiments which had hitherto contained none but Macedonians, and levied 30,000 troops from the most warlike districts of Asia, whom he armed in the Macedonian manner.

16. Death of Alexander.—Since the voyage of Nearchus, Alexander had determined on an expedition against Arabia by sea, and had given orders for ships to be built in Phoenicia, and then taken to pieces and carried by land to Thapsäkus on the Euphrates. At Thapsakus they were to be put together again, and so make their way to Babylon, from which the expedition was to start. In the spring of B.C. 323, Alexander set out from Susa for Babylon. On his journey he was met by embassies from nearly all the States of the known world. At Babylon he found the ships ready: fresh troops had arrived, both Greek and Asiatic; and the expedition was on the point of starting, when Alexander was seized with fever and died (June, B.C. 323). He was only thirty-two years old.

17. The Aims of Alexander.—It is sometimes said that the purpose of Alexander was to make Asia like Greece, by founding cities like the Greek. The actual result of his conquests was that the western part of Asia later on became partly Greek, but this was much more the work of Alexander's successors than of Alexander himself. With the exception of Alexandria, the colonies which Alexander founded were settlements of soldiers in remote districts, for the purpose of keeping the empire in subjection, not of making it Greek. That Alexander wished to make the nations of his empire more like a single people is clear

from his encouraging his soldiers to marry Persian women ; but this is not the same thing as saying that he wished to spread Greek intelligence, art, and literature, over his empire by means of cities. Nor is there any reason to suppose that Alexander meant to introduce a new system of government into the Persian Empire. He kept up the satrapies and the Persian mode of taxation ; and the chief difference between his government and that of the Persian kings would be, that Alexander meant to preserve absolute authority himself by means of his army, and to keep the satraps completely under his own control, whereas the Persian kings had been weak and indolent, and the satraps had become like independent princes. It is clear from his dealings with Egypt and Babylon that he meant to pay more attention to the wishes of the different nations of the empire than the Persians had done ; and, though he had no new system of government, he would have greatly altered the condition of the empire by making roads, ports, and docks, and everything that could advance commerce and bring the different nations into communication with one another. In the matter of government Alexander probably thought that the Greeks had more to learn from the Persians than the Persians from the Greeks, and considered the Persian system of one great empire under a single king to be much better, when vigorously conducted, than the Greek system of little States and leagues.

18. Results of Alexander's Conquests.—At the death of Alexander his empire was divided among his generals. A great number of cities, such as Antioch (Acts xi. 26) and Seleucia, were founded in western Asia, inhabited partly by Asiatics, partly by Greeks coming from all the scattered Greek States. It was the experience of the Greeks in settling among other races (p. 35) that now made them able to settle so successfully in Asia, and introduce their own ways among the people wherever they

settled. Though under the dominion of Alexander's successors these cities could not be independent States like the old Greek cities, and could therefore bring little of the old Greek liberty, high spirit, and self-respect into Asia, they spread the Greek language and the common Greek habits of life very extensively. In external appearance these cities would be Greek : there would be the temples, statues, baths, theatre, colonnades, &c., of a Greek city ; religious ceremonies and festivals would be conducted in the Greek manner (Acts xiv. 11-13) ; Greek would be the language most spoken, and Greek books would be read and written ; though from the mixture of races there would always be something about the citizens distinguishing them from the inhabitants of purely Greek States. In some districts, as in Syria, Greek habits spread very easily ; in others, as in Judæa, the most obstinate resistance to them was made by the native population. Antiöchus Epiphānes, king of Syria, tried to introduce Greek worship at the Temple of Jerusalem. The Jews revolted, under the Maccabees, and made themselves independent (B.C. 160). Yet in spite of this the Greek language and a good many Greek ideas spread over the towns of Judæa. Thus the books of the New Testament were written in Greek.

19. *Asia*.—Alexander's empire broke up into three principal kingdoms—Macedonia, Asia, and Egypt. The kings of Asia were the Seleukidæ, the descendants of Seleukus, one of Alexander's generals. They were not able to preserve Alexander's conquests in Asia as a single kingdom. One part after another of their empire was lost. Rhodes and other islands formed a powerful maritime league and kept themselves independent. On the west coast of Asia Minor there rose an independent kingdom called Pergāmus, Greek in its manners ; in the north and centre of Asia Minor a number of States were formed, such as Pontus and Kappadokia, with little trace of anything Greek about them. Beyond the Euphrates the

Parthians revolted and founded a regular Asiatic State. The Jews made themselves free in the south. Thus the kingdom of Asia was gradually narrowed down to the kingdom of Syria; and together with all the other States as far as the Euphrates it fell at last into the hands of the Romans, and became a province of the Roman empire (B.C. 63).

20. **Egypt.**—Egypt was governed by the family of the Ptolemies; and, as in Asia, Greek was the language employed in government, and the principal offices were in the hands of Greeks. The Greeks and the native Egyptians kept quite distinct from one another (Acts xxi. 37, 38). Alexandria was thronged with Greeks and Jews. A University was founded there, and all the most learned men of Greece were brought together. Euclid the mathematician and Ptolemy the astronomer wrote at Alexandria. There was a library which contained almost everything that had been written in Greek. But though science and learning flourished in Alexandria, there was none of the old Greek poetic genius, or simple, natural, force of mind. Nothing was written there to compare with the works of the great Athenian writers. It was at Alexandria that the Greek translation of the Old Testament was made (B.C. 275–250), and that learned Jews became acquainted with the ideas of those Greeks who had thought most on religion. The last Greek sovereign of Egypt was the famous Queen Cleopatra. At her death Egypt was made a Roman province by Augustus, B.C. 30.

21. **Macedonia.**—There was confusion in Macedonia for a long time after the death of Alexander, and we cannot here relate the wars of the rival kings. In B.C. 289 a tribe of Gauls invaded Macedonia, and did much mischief: they afterwards crossed into Asia Minor, where they learnt something of Greek ways, and formed the state called Galatia, or Gallo-Græcia (Acts xvi. 6). After this things became settled in Macedonia, and the descendants of Antigonus, one

of Alexander's generals, kept the throne until the Romans put an end to the monarchy. Philip, who was king of Macedon at the time of the second war between Karthage and Rome, allied himself with Karthage; and when the war was over, the Romans made war on Philip and defeated him at Kynoskephālæ (B.C. 197). They put an end to the control of Macedonia over Greece, and declared all the Greek States to be free. In B.C. 171, there was again war between Macedonia and Rome, Perseus being now king. Perseus was overthrown in the battle of Pydna (B.C. 168): the monarchy was abolished, and Macedonia divided into five republics. Twenty-two years later, on pretence of a rebellion, Macedonia was made a Roman province.

22. Greek States. Achæan League.—At the death of Alexander, Athens and many other States rose against Macedon, but were brought into subjection. Demosthenes had to fly from Athens, and being pursued by the Macedonians took poison to avoid falling into their hands. For the next fifty years there was confusion. About B.C. 260 Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia, was master of all Greece, except Sparta. Freedom, however, was now restored to a large part of Greece by the growth of two leagues, the *Achæan League* and the *Ætolian League*. The Achæan League was originally the league of ten Achæan cities on the north coast of Peloponnesus (p. 15), and hitherto it had done nothing in Greek history. Antigonus had established tyrants in these cities, and it was in the effort to get rid of these, and to free other cities from similar tyrants, that the league became the active and important enemy of Macedon. About B.C. 240, Arātus of Sikyon, who had united Sikyon to the league, and been made its president, rescued Corinth from the Macedonians; and the league was now joined not only by all the Peloponnesian cities except Sparta and a few others, but by Athens and Ægina.

23. Ætolian League.—North of the Corinthian Gulf the rough tribes of the Ætolians (p. 88), who did not live in cities like most of the Greeks, and were altogether more like a barbarous people, formed a league which now became very powerful. They gained control over Phokis, Lokris, and Bœotia; but were held in ill repute on account of their plundering expeditions.

24. Sparta.—Sparta had preserved its independence against Macedonia, but it had lost its old character; the number of full citizens had fallen to 700, and all the land belonged to about 100 families. About B.C. 240, Agis, king of Sparta, attempted to abolish debts and divide the land, so as to create a large body of citizens anew. He was opposed by the rich and put to death, but his successor, Kleomènes, carried out his plans, and made Sparta again for the moment a powerful state. The Achæan League and Sparta were jealous of one another, and went to war. Kleomenes defeated Aratus, and Aratus sacrificed the independent character of the League by asking the Macedonian king for help, and allowing it to fall very much under the control of Macedon. Sparta was overthrown (B.C. 221), but the League gained nothing by it. Immediately afterwards there was war between the Achæan and Ætolian Leagues, and the Achæan League again asked help of Macedonia.

25. Greece made a Roman Province.—In B.C. 211, on account of Philip's assisting Hannibal, the Romans made alliance with the Ætolian League against him; and from this time the Romans continued to interfere in the affairs of Greece, until in B.C. 146, having been appealed to by Sparta against the Achæan League, they captured Corinth, and made Greece into a Roman province.

26. The Vice of the Greeks their Disunion. All through Greek history there is the same cause at work, ruining the power of Greece, and causing it endless miseries,—the incapacity of the Greeks for acting together. Not only does this appear in the

wars between the cities, and in their failure to form any lasting union, but still more in the division which existed within each city. Within the same city-walls the opposite parties hated one another more bitterly than any foreign enemy. Other nations have had a greater gift for government, and have possessed that power of acting together which was so fatally wanting in the Greeks. In reading the history of the Greeks this great fault is brought clearly before us; but many of the great qualities of the Greeks do not come before us in a history at all. Their quickness, their love of knowledge, their power of creating beautiful things, cannot be brought home to us by a mere account of their actions. To understand these, and to do justice to the real greatness of the Greeks, we must read the books written by the Greeks themselves, and know something of their works of art. No one who has taken the trouble to make himself thus acquainted with the Greeks has ever regretted the labour which it cost him.

17*

THE END.



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